

ANALYZING THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS RIGHT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH

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The aim of this essay is to analyze the influence of the American Religious Right (RR) on U.S. foreign policy in the context of International Relations (IR) theory. While classifying the Religious Right as a pressure group (also in foreign policy), the author argues that its effectiveness can be analyzed through Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) schemes. An important part of the article is also dedicated to the question concerning the role of religion: is it only used instrumentally to justify various (geopolitical) decisions, or can it realistically influence foreign policy and IR?

Keywords: American religious right, Christian right, Foreign policy, International relations theory, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).

Introduction

The aim of this essay is to analyze the influence of the American Religious Right (RR), originally called the “Christian Right” on U.S. foreign policy. The movement was created in the late 1970s and since then has been an important actor on the American political scene. Although it has been known mostly for influencing domestic politics, its attempts to influence U.S. foreign policy have also been evident. The essay presents the RR as an active pressure group and analyzes examples of its endeavor to influence the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process. It also presents the ideas shaping the movement’s foreign policy goals and methods used by the movement to achieve its aims. Additionally, it tries to answer the question, whether any of the RR’s actions were successful enough to actually affect U.S. foreign policy or maybe its rhetoric was only used instrumentally by the state. The main hypothesis is whether it is possible that the movement actually managed to influence some of the U.S. foreign policy decisions and through them also (at least to a certain degree) international relations (IR) in general. All these questions are presented in the perspective of the IR theory and foreign policy analysis, which for a long time disregarded the so-called religious factor - and still need to develop new approaches to religion-related problems¹.

¹ In this article I use some long fragments of my two recent texts accepted by Peter Lang Publishing Group for publication in two edited volumes: *International Relations Theory Application in Asia and Africa* and *Global Policy in the 21st Century: Between Regional Cooperation and Conflict*. One of the texts concerns the role of religion in U.S. Middle East policy, and the other describes regional interests of the American Religious Right. This article summarizes all attempts of the Religious Right to influence American foreign policy, holistically completing the

Theoretical Framework and the State of Art

Although scholars nowadays usually agree that religion is one of the many factors influencing international relations², it is important to remember that the religious factor stayed on the backburner in the study of international relations (IR) for a long time³. This has been especially evident in theoretical approaches⁴. Although, after the end of the Cold War the role of religion in international affairs started to be noticed, the actual moment when religious actors attracted academia's and publics' attention was when they violently came back to global politics with the events of 9/11. And yet, the theory of IR still has not much to say about it⁵. As many scholars stress, the main schools of thought in international relations have not developed coherent models integrating the religious factor into the theory⁶ and many questions regarding how and why religion influences international affairs remain unanswered⁷. Therefore, discussing the role of religion and religious groups in contemporary IR, as well as in foreign policy, through which it influences IR is a very difficult task, especially if one wants to place it in a theoretical frame.

The reason why theoretical schools of international relations stayed away from religion for decades, despite the fact that religion has been recognized as an important factor in shaping national and ethnic identity, can be attributed to several causes. First of all, the separation of religion and international politics began as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, regarded as the starting point of contemporary state system⁸. According to Kubalkova, the secularity of international politics, which was then postulated, and the system of states (with its concept of sovereignty and non-intervention) was expected to act as a shield against any inter- or intra-religious excesses, such as the Christian wars of the 17th century, which the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 brought to an end⁹. If these fields were supposed to be separated in practice, there was no reason to connect them in any way in theory. The second reason was the conviction that as the world was getting "modernized," it was also expected to become "secularized." Thinkers such as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, August Comte, Emile Durkheim were convinced that with modernization, public education and access to different kind of information, religion will disappear, at least from the public life¹⁰. The third reason concerned the fact that during the time of World Wars, there were new ideologies and political doctrines developed (including nationalism, communism or liberalism), which were either at odds with religion, or expected to replace it¹¹.

topic. Most importantly, it places the analysis in a theoretical perspective and compares various academic opinions on the role of religion in IR.

² The authors list it within the so called determining or conditioning factors - as opposed to implementation factors. Cziomer, Erhard (ed.): *Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych*. Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. Kraków 2014, p. 49. More in: Solarz, Anna M./Schreiber, Hanna (eds.): *Religia w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Warszawa 2012. Zenderowski, Radosław: „Religia w teorii stosunków międzynarodowych”. In: Burgoński, Piotr/Gierycz, Michał (eds.): *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*. Elipsa. Warszawa 2014, p. 562.

³ Sandal, Nukhet A./James, Patrick. “Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding.” In: *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (1), 2010, p. 3. More in: Fox, Jonathan: “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations.” *The International Studies Review* 3 (3), 2001, pp. 53-73.

⁴ Zenderowski, op. cit., pp.548-551; Sandal/James, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵ Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 562.

⁶ More in: Zenderowski, op.cit., pp. 562-569; Sandal/James, op. cit.

⁷ It does not mean that religion was totally omitted, however, it was almost never analyzed as individual factor, but rather as a part of broader categories, such as culture, civilization or terrorism. More in: Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 549.

⁸ Sandal/James, op. cit., p. 3.

⁹ Kubalkova, Vendulka: *The “Turn to Religion” in International Relations Theory*, 2013, retrived 10.01.2018 from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/03/the-turn-to-religion-in-international-relations-theory/>.

¹⁰ Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 548.

¹¹ Cziomer, op. cit., p. 56.

And indeed, the European process of religion's withdrawal from public sphere lasted until the 1960s¹². However, in the late 1960 and in the 1970s, a revert process, coined by Jose Casanova as "de-privatization of religion", occurred¹³. Additionally, at the end of the Cold War, when the bi-polar world order collapsed, religion as a distinct feature of identity on levels ranging from individual to transnational started to draw public attention¹⁴. There was a renaissance of certain religious groups, some of which entered politics and international relations. Some scholars viewed it as politicization of religion¹⁵. Most of them assumed, however, that such processes were rather associated with the undeveloped countries, including post-communist or post-colonial (mostly Islamic) regions¹⁶. Some academics, on the other hand, especially Samuel Huntington, started to concentrate on religion so much, that they overlooked other factors influencing international politics (including economic or social ones). But even the so called "cultural turn" in political studies and international relations in the 1990s¹⁷, which was partly started by the academic activity of Huntington and partly by other scholars who appreciated the role of culture in politics, did not result in a successful incorporation of religion into IR theoretical models.

Samuel Huntington, who postulated to create a new paradigm with religion and civilization as central categories did bring religion to public attention¹⁸. However, according to many scholars, instead of creating a reasonable theoretical framework, his proposition - together with some other elements of the "cultural turn" - resulted in overemphasizing the term "civilization", with religion as part of it, and in instrumentalizing both of them¹⁹. Samuel Huntington's clash of civilization thesis met with a wide critique²⁰. Professor Shireen Hunter argues that Hunter might have found such an interest in religion as arguably the strongest force in international relations because the end of the Cold War ideologies left the paradigm vacuum. As she explains:

This left many feeling disoriented by the more fluid and complex character of Post-ideological international relations, thus setting them off in search of a new paradigm which could simplify and explicate this new and confusing state of affairs. Sam Huntington's clash of civilization was a direct result of a Soviet era intellectual's effort to recreate the simplicity of Cold War paradigm. But as Cold War paradigm never either completely determined the character of international relations nor explained its complexities and shifts, the theory of clash of civilizations has proven equally faulty, although it has possibly caused more damage than the Cold War paradigm²¹.

As Daniel Nexon has argued: "fetishizing religion is as much a danger as not taking it seriously enough"²². Therefore, Huntington's idea was generally rejected by scholars²³. However, it was widely publicized and made an impact on the media and conventional wisdom in general. This together with the

¹² Ibidem. Some authors also stress that this withdrawal was a typically European process that influenced the academia thinking, while in other parts of the world nothing like this happened.

¹³ More in: Casanova, José: *Public Religions in the Modern World*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago 1994.

¹⁴ Sandal/James, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁵ Cesarz, Zbigniew/Stadtmüller, Elżbieta: *Problemy polityczne współczesnego świata*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Wrocław 1996, pp. 327-328 cited in: Cziomer, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁶ Cziomer, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁷ More in: Schreiber, Hanna: „Religia jako element 'zwrotu kulturowego' w stosunkach międzynarodowych”. In: Solarz/Schreiber (eds.), op. cit., pp. 51-76.

¹⁸ Huntington, Samuel: "The Clash of Civilizations?" In: *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3), 1993, pp. 22-49.

¹⁹ Schreiber, op. cit.

²⁰ More about Huntington's critique in: Zenderowski, op. cit., pp. 559-562; Fox, Jonathan/Sandler Shmuel: *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, London 2004, p. 115-135.

²¹ Hunter, Shireen: *Religion and International Affairs: From Neglect to Over-Emphasis*, 2010, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/07/religion-and-international-affairs-from-neglect-to-over-emphasis>.

²² Nexon, Daniel: "Religion and International Relations: No Leap of Faith." In: Snyder, Jack (ed.): *Religion and International Relations Theory*. Columbia University Press. New York: 2011, p.161, cited in: Bettiza, Gregorio: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Desecularization of American Foreign Policy, 1990-2012*, 2012, retrived 10.02.2018 from: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/728/1/Bettiza_Global_resurgence_religion_2012.pdf, p. 305.

²³ Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 564.

lack of any new theoretical frameworks that would incorporate religion, resulted in leaving politicians, populists and journalists with the task of providing explanations to such events as the 9/11 attacks. The simplified answers to the questions concerning the ties between religion and international politics that they found were quite often limited to demonizing Islam, directly linking it to terrorism²⁴ and omitting many other religious factors, actors and themes in international relations.

It was mostly after the events of the 9/11, that more scholars started to reflect on the role of religion in IR and tried to incorporate it into IR theory - in order to be able to analyze its influence in a more systematic way. The scholarship on religion in IR has since been divided. One group of academics have suggested that religion's return poses a fundamental challenge to IR theory and therefore new and alternative paradigms should be developed²⁵, another group instead have argued that the study of religion in IR does not require a revolution, but rather an evolution in the theoretical frameworks currently at our disposal²⁶. Additionally, there have been scholars working on new approaches incorporating religion not only into IR theory, but also to foreign policy analysis, sometimes even trying connecting both approaches²⁷.

Zenderowski described the situation in IR theory concentrating on the fact that most scholars are not sure how to "incorporate" religion to particular IR theories and existing schools of thought - without undermining their core assumptions and basic structure²⁸. As he reminded, theoretical research approaches in IR can be divided into materialistic (e.g. realism, structural realism, liberalism with its variations or neo-Marxism) and non-materialistic (constructivism and English School). Theoretically, the latter ones (which take into consideration such elements of IR as norms, values, convictions or identity) should be more likely and open to incorporate religion. And yet, as he claims, none of them was successful in doing so²⁹. Surprisingly however, as he suggests, although not too many realists want to admit it, religion could be included in realism – not as an independent variable but to a certain degree as a motivating factor³⁰.

James and Sandal presented some more possibilities of incorporating religion into international relations schools of thought. While declaring, just like Zenderowski, that the English School did not use its potential to include religion into its reflections³¹, unlike him, they refuse to analyze constructivism as a separate paradigm or an independent school of thought. They take this position "because of an implicit assumption that constructivism is a methodological approach rather than a school of thought by itself. Thus it can be employed even in the midst of realist and neoliberal paradigms toward their improvement"³². They analyze three schools of thought carefully: classical realism, neo-realism and neoliberalism, claiming that these ones have the potential of incorporating religion into their theoretical schemes. While doing so, they also criticize the fact that since the events of 9/11 there has been a tendency "to point either to religion as a generic concept or to a particular faith to account for complex

²⁴ More in: Zenderowski, op. cit., p. 547.

²⁵ Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito Fabio: "The Return from Exile: An Introduction." In: Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito Fabio (eds.): *Religion in International Relations: the Return from Exile*, Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke; New York: 2003, p.3; Kubalkova, Vidulka: "Toward an International Political Theology." In: Hatzopoulos, Pavlos/Petito (eds.), *Ibidem*, pp. 79-105; Thomas, Scott: *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: the Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York; Basingstoke 2005, pp.72-77.

²⁶ Nexon, op. cit., Sandal/James, op. cit.

²⁷ e.g.: Bettiza, op. cit., Warner, Carolyn M. / Walker, Stephen G.: "Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, 2011, pp. 113–135.

²⁸ Zenderowski, op. cit., s. 564.

²⁹ *Ibidem*. Bettiza on the other hand, thinks constructivism and English school were successful in it to some extent.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 563-569.

³¹ Sandal/James, op. cit., p. 4

³² *Ibidem*, p. 7. They agree with Klotz and Lynch that 'constructivism' means different things to different scholars, but there is an agreement that the focus is on 'capturing processes of mutual constitution' (p.7). More in: Klotz, Audie / Lynch Cecelia: *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. M.E. Sharpe. London 2007.

interactions and events”³³ without paying much attention to the circumstances, background conditions and other variables. They stress that religion is not an omnipotent variable. “Religious phenomena should be investigated as an independent (as a cause), intervening (as a link between the cause and the resulting observation) and dependent variable (as the ‘product’ of non-religious causes)”³⁴, what can be done using the three approaches listed above. In classical realism and in neo-realism, rational states (that seek power) are the key units of action for policy-making and for policy analysis. Therefore, many scholars have expressed their pessimism about the integration of culture and identity into this school of thought. However, the authors claim that realism allows for a number of independent variables ranging from ‘human nature’ to ‘distribution of capabilities’³⁵. For them: “Classical realism is most suitable for sub-state accounts of religion. The focus on human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power (...) allows for studies of belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence”³⁶. Religion as a tool of legitimacy also can be studied under this framework, given the definition of power with a focus on influence. At the same time, as they claim, structural realism is the most challenging framework³⁷. And yet, in their opinion, some ethnic conflicts, with their strong religious overtones, could be considered examples of the ‘security dilemma’ and therefore their explanation could borrow from structural realist terminology³⁸. On the other hand, they suggest that if one wants to look at religious organizations/institutions and related transnational phenomena, neoliberalism looks like the most suitable framework for such investigations in mainstream IR theory³⁹.

It seems that in analyzing the influence of the American Religious Right (RR) classical realism framework could be helpful to a certain degree. Perhaps, it could help analyze whether religion represented by the RR takes part in legitimizing state actions or shaping worldviews (of the state or the head of state). However, it would be problematic in several respects. First of all, the religious views promoted by the RR are not representative to the majority of the society or even to most of the leaders. Secondly, it seems that the RR works much more as a pressure group - interested in both, domestic issues and foreign issues. At the same time, classical realism considers states not only key units of political actions, but also units that are monolithic. Thus analyzing the RR’s pressure on foreign policy decision within this scheme is problematic.

If we want to analyze the role of pressure groups or interest groups we need to refer to the pluralist approach in political sciences. In terms of foreign policy we would need to refer the so called foreign policy analysis (FPA), which – through adapting a behaviorist approach - departs from classical realism in the sense that a state, although remaining the main actor in international relations, is not considered a homogenous entity. FPA, considered by a certain number of scholars a subfield of IR⁴⁰, assumes that there are many intra-state actors influencing foreign policy decisions⁴¹. And although not all authors are eager to connect the IR theory with the FPA, there have been certain attempts to do so⁴². When it comes to religion, it is worth mentioning that originally FPA did not discuss its role specifically, however assumed that culture as a characteristic of the society may be one of the factors influencing foreign policy decisions⁴³. With time some scholars decided that also religion itself - as part of culture - can be taken into consideration within FPA. In fact, Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker have shown in their

³³ Sandal/James, op. cit., p. 6.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 8.

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 18.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 19.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ Hudson, Valerie M.: “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations”. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, 2005, p. 1.

⁴¹ Including also domestic pressure groups and public at large. More in: Ibidem and in: Pugacewicz, Tomasz: *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej*. WUJ. Krakow: 2017.

⁴² More in: Bettiza, op. cit.

⁴³ Pugacewicz, op. cit., p. 141.

analysis that religion can be included into FPA in many different ways, including an institutional level⁴⁴. Other recently developed frameworks for the analysis of religion in foreign policy also fall squarely within FPA's theoretical mainstream⁴⁵. I argue that since the RR (which promotes a very specific kind of religion) can be considered an interest group (not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy), its influence should be analyzed within such FPA models that take into consideration the activity of many different interest groups in foreign policy decision making process⁴⁶. What is more, it seems logical that if the RR is able to influence state's foreign policy decisions, it can also influence international affairs (at least to a certain degree). In fact the recent attempts to connect FPA with IR theory allow to analyze the role of religion (or religious groups such as the RR) in international relations⁴⁷.

Valerie M. Hudson stresses that after analyzing the history and trends in the study of FPA, "it is clear that this subfield provides what may be the best conceptual connection to the empirical ground upon which all international relations (IR) theory is based"⁴⁸. As Bettiza notices, while FPA scholars have long avoided a direct engagement with IR theories and paradigms, IR theorists have gradually paid attention to their critics and admitted that their approach had overly-structural biases. Representatives of many IR theoretical paradigms, have moved beyond the structural determinism of much of Cold War era IR and sought to reconcile and bring human and state agency back in their theorizing. Some have looked at FPA to capture agency and change, at the same time not fully embracing the actor-centered reductionism of many FPA approaches⁴⁹. Bettiza stresses that a new generation of Neoclassical Realists attempt to bring together the structural insights of Neo-realists on the anarchical characteristics of the international system, with the human dimension of decision-making emphasized by Classical Realists (and much FPA). They do so to explain variations in states' grand strategies and foreign policies "by focusing on the interaction between system-level independent material variables (anarchy and polarity), with domestic intervening variables"⁵⁰. As intervening variables they consider either the role of elites, institutions, pressure groups, and party politics, or ideational factors such as culture, identity, and ideas, or even a mix of both. "So as system level variables stay constant or change, so a number of options open up or close down for domestic-policy makers to pursue their differing foreign policy preferences"⁵¹. This perspective may also include religious interest groups.

As Bettiza argues however, these attempts have still been rare and FPA scholars rather avoided greater engagement with broader IR theoretical debates and IR theories⁵². The theoretical divisions between the broader field of IR theory and the particular sub-field of FPA have long existed as the first was conceived as a theory of macro-structures and international systems, and the second one as micro-oriented, agent-centered and actor-specific theory explaining human actions and state behavior. Therefore, Bettiza himself tries to build a possible framework that reconciles the widening gap that has come to exist between IR and FPA theories. He does it by adopting a Historical Sociological approach to FPA. This allows him to bring together debates on religious resurgence in IR (in general) and in American foreign policy. His main interest is the analysis of the mechanisms of foreign policy change,

⁴⁴ Warner/Walker, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Bettiza gives an example of Haynes' framework. Bettiza, op. cit., p. 68. More in: Haynes, Jeffrey: "Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the USA, India and Iran: Towards a Research Agenda." *Third World Quarterly* 29 (1), 2008, pp. 143-165.

⁴⁶ About different models: Pugacewicz, op. cit., p. 202.

⁴⁷ More in: Bettiza, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Hudson, op. cit., p. 1. Other scholars however have argued that IR theory and FPA theory may not even be commensurable, e.g. K. Waltz. More in: Waltz, Kenneth N.: "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In: Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press. New York 1986, pp. 322-346.

⁴⁹ Bettiza, op. cit., p. 57-58.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 58. Bettiza talks about: Lobell, Steven E./ Ripsman, Norrin M./ Taliaferro Jeffrey W.: *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge; New York 2009 and: Rose, Gideon: "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 51 (01), 1998, pp.144-172.

⁵¹ Bettiza, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 51.

which as he argues, have been brought about by the complex interaction of domestic actors (including the RR) at the micro-level, embedded, however, and responding to macro-processes of global change (mainly de-secularization) during a specific historical period (the end of the Cold War to the present)⁵³.

While I find his model very helpful and I agree with him that both external and internal factors have to be taken into consideration while analyzing foreign policy change, my main interest in this article is not the change of American foreign policy due to religious factors in general (especially not due to the external ones) but analyzing the attempts of a specific religious actor to influence certain foreign policy decisions by acting as a specific interest group. Therefore, in this case the most useful for me is such a FPA scheme that is open to considering and including religious actors as interests groups, operating similarly to many other pressure groups⁵⁴. At the same time, I acknowledge that because of the assumption that by influencing certain decisions, such actors can also influence IR in general, schemes connecting the IR and FPA approach, including the neo-realist proposition, which was mentioned above, might be very useful in further analysis.

It is worth mentioning that there have been some works exploring the role and impact of religion (in its various forms) on American foreign policy through the lens of the FPA theoretical framework so far. Scholars have examined the domestic sphere of the U.S. for example to explain how the religious convictions of presidents and policy makers have recently⁵⁵ or historically⁵⁶ influenced American grand strategy. Some authors have also explored the impact of: some religious advocates and interest groups, e.g. Roman Catholics, Evangelical and Mainline Protestants⁵⁷, the demographic growth of Evangelicals⁵⁸ and the increased political influence of the Christian Right, especially during the G.W. Bush's administration⁵⁹. Others have explored how religious convictions shape public attitudes towards American foreign policy⁶⁰. Additionally, there have been books analyzing various connections between the Christian Right, G.W. Bush's presidency and politics (both domestic and foreign), including rhetoric and communication approaches⁶¹.

⁵³ He also explains that there have already been works that have used the Historical Sociological (HS) approach to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), e.g. by Fred Halliday, Brian Mabee, and Chris Alden and Amnon Aran. More in: Bettiza, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Keeping in mind that not all of the FPA models allow for including interests groups in foreign policy decision-making process. More about various models of FPA in: Pugacewicz, op. cit.

⁵⁵ Bacevich, Andrew / Prodromou, Elizabeth: "God Is Not Neutral: Religion and US Foreign Policy after 9/11." *Orbis* 48 (1), 2004, pp. 43-54.

⁵⁶ Inboden, William: *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: the Soul of Containment*. Cambridge University Press. New York 2008.

⁵⁷ Sometimes belonging to larger umbrella organizations such as: The World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches, National Assembly of Evangelical: Rock, Stephen R.: *Faith and Foreign Policy: the Views and Influence of U.S. Christians and Christian Organizations*. Continuum International. New York 2011.

⁵⁸ Mead, Walter Russell: "God's Country." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (5), 2006, pp. 24-43.

⁵⁹ Croft, Stuart: "Thy Will Be Done: The New Foreign Policy of Americas Christian Right. *International Politics* 44 (6), 2007, pp. 692-710; Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake: the Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*. Zed Books. New York 2008.

⁶⁰ Guth, James L.: "Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy Issues." In: Guth James L./Kellstedt Lyman A./Smidt Corwin E. (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, Oxford University Press. New York 2009, pp. 243-265.

⁶¹ Kaplan, Esther: *With God on Their Side. George W. Bush and the Christian Right*. The New Press. New York 2005; Butler, Jennifer: *Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized*. Pluto Press. Ann Arbor 2006; Philips, Kevin: *American Theocracy: the Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century*. Viking. New York 2006; Domke, David S.: *God Willing?: Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the 'War on Terror' and the Echoing Press*. Pluto Press. Ann Arbor 2004; Buss, Doris/Herman, Didi: *Globalizing Family Values The Christian Right in International Politics*. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis 2003; Weber, Tim P.: *On the Road to Armageddon: How Evangelicals Became Israel's Best Friend*. Baker Academic. Grand Rapids 2004.

Specific Research Questions and Particular Aims of the Article

In this article I am presenting the RR (comprised of many smaller organizations) as one of U.S. interest groups that attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy using various methods. I assume that although it is a very specific pressure group, its role in American foreign policy can be analyzed through the prism of certain FPA models. The focus of the analysis will be placed not only on the recent foreign-policy related actions of the movement, but also on many pressure attempts it has made since its creation in the late 1970s. I will therefore take into account consecutive presidential administration periods since the Ronald Reagan's first term in office. It is important to stress that the RR is one of many interest groups that sometimes also act secretly in their attempts to influence U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, it is not always possible to trace all actors taking part in the decision-making. In cases that involved the RR it might also be difficult to follow the whole process of weighting contradictory (or overlapping) interests of various groups. However, what is possible is to: explain the interests of the RR as a foreign policy pressure group, identify U.S. foreign policy areas in which the RR has been specifically interested, analyze the methods used the RR in order to influence certain decisions and to trace the movement's interactions and connections with at least some other interest groups. It will also be important to ask a question concerning the attention given to the RR's efforts by the political decision-makers and to make an attempt of assessing the extent to which its voice was taken into consideration in specific cases. I am especially interested in whether the RR's arguments have only been used instrumentally to legitimize U.S. actions abroad, as some authors argue, or has the movement, at least in certain aspects, managed to actually influence U.S. foreign policy, and through it - the IR in general?

In the context of the last questions, it is useful to go back to Shireen Hunter's observations. First of all, she admits that "[r]eligion affects the character of international relations (...) by influencing the behavior of states and increasingly non-state actors"⁶². She adds that in the case of state actors in democratic systems it happens through the "activities of religious groups aimed at influencing state behavior"⁶³. However, she also adds that security concerns, economic interests and the desire to prevent any undermining of the international balance of power are much more important than religion can ever be. Therefore, she concludes that religion plays "the same role that ideologies of various kinds have played, namely to legitimize policy decisions and garner popular support for them"⁶⁴. With this statement she implies that the use of religion has always been instrumental.

I am going to examine this view in the context of the RR's activity. In order to do so, it will be helpful to use Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger's framework, in which they distinguish three kinds of the religion's role in IR: primordial, instrumental and moderately constructive⁶⁵. Adding the third option, they claim that religion can be viewed as an intervening variable.

⁶² Hunter, *op.cit.* At the same time she stresses that even HAMAS, Hizbullah or Al Qaeda have been either created or are still being influenced and financed by state actors.

⁶³ And through "the proclivities of key political leaders" (e.g. the influence of Christian values on the idealism of Wilson, religious motivations during the Cold War or Jimmy Carter's involvement in the Middle East Peace process). *Ibidem.*

⁶⁴ According to Hunter, even in the case of Saudi Arabia or the Islamic Republic of Iran (which are based on different branches of Islam), religion, like secular ideologies, plays a purely instrumental role namely that of justifying state policies rather determining them.

⁶⁵ Hasenclever, Andreas/Rittberger, Volker: "Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict". In: Hatzopoulos/Petito, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-147. In their study they analyze the role of religion especially in international conflicts. According to them, primordialists' option suggests that differences in religious traditions "should be viewed as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent interactions in and between nations" (p. 107) - just like Samuel Huntington would do. Instrumentalists view religion as mostly useful in justifying and legitimizing certain state's policies. Moderate constructivists see religion as an intervening variable which can influenced a different course of policy than the one initially planned by the state. The authors focus on the fact that "religious leaders can refuse to bless the weapons, and then violence may not occur even if significant socioeconomic and political inequalities exist in or between societies" - in order to stress that the religion may not only legitimize but also ease some conflicts. I will focus on the fact that when

Religious Groups as Interest Groups

As already mentioned, according to pluralist and behavioral perspectives, various internal actors, including interest groups can influence the decision-making process, also in foreign policy. In the context of this essay, it is useful to look closer at a very specific kind of these groups – the religious interest groups. Most generally, an interest group is defined as a group of people who share some interest or set of interests and pursue them through the political system⁶⁶. It is important to add that an interest group is usually formally organized and can be comprised not only of individuals but also of smaller organizations. As such it attempts to influence government policy in its favor by using various methods, including lobbying. Religious groups can also act in this manner. In fact, there is a number of religious interest groups in the USA (including Mainline Protestant groups, Catholic and Jewish organizations⁶⁷, black churches, and Evangelical interest groups). According to Allen Hertzke, the number of religious interest groups in Washington has been constantly rising since the 1950s⁶⁸. He also notices that the diversity of religious lobbying groups in the US has increased and their religious agendas have become broader. Therefore, it is quite important to distinguish at least two main types of religious interest groups: *church based groups* (e.g. Presbyterians or the Baptist Joint Committee) and *individual membership groups* (e.g. Evangelicals for Social Action)⁶⁹. If we examine the RR in this respect, it is necessary to conclude that most of the organizations that it includes represent the second type⁷⁰.

Generally, religious interest groups share characteristics of other pressure groups. And yet, some authors have argued that while traditional interest groups focus mainly on material interests, for the religious ones it is not the primary consideration⁷¹. Religious lobbyists who represent theological traditions often promote certain (e.g. biblical) values, instead of only seeking material benefits. However, in order to achieve specific goals, such as: passing a certain law, preventing it from being passed, overturning past policies or changing their interpretation, they are ready to use various strategies, similar to the ones applied by other interest groups. And so, their efforts might involve direct lobbying or placing pressure on politicians through: mobilizing voters (before elections or referendum voting), shaping public opinion, organizing media campaigns (in order to persuade general public to support certain policy goals), writing letters to editors of newspapers or magazines, employing grassroots efforts (such as personal visits, letters, telegrams, phone calls, e-mails, fax messages), creating their own media, organizing electoral campaigns or contributing to the campaigns of the candidates (either those who already support their view point, or those who are willing to “soften” or “modify” their positions). Additionally, they can act through court cases (e.g. questioning the interpretation of the First Amendment), or even seek public office themselves (e.g. Pat Robertson). Quite often they organize protests: marches, demonstrations, boycotts, or freedom rides⁷². All of these strategies can be applied not only in order to influence domestic policy but also to put pressure on the foreign policy decision-making process. However, among the most common methods used in order to achieve certain foreign policy aims there are: direct lobbying and

religion is an intervening variable (moderate constructivists’ approach), it can also influence more violent actions than initially planned by the state (as long as they are still in accordance with the general political or economic interest of the state).

⁶⁶ Corbett, Michael: *American Public Opinion: Trends, Processes, and Patterns*. Longman. New York 1991, p. 292, cited in: Corbett, Michael/Corbett Julia M.: *Politics and Religion in the United States*. Garland Publishing. New York 1999, p. 338.

⁶⁷ Among the well-known Jewish organizations there is e.g. American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) - a pro-Israel lobby. There are also Hasidic or Orthodox groups as well as liberal Jewish organizations. Orthodox and Hasidic Jews tend to share the views of conservative Protestants but most Jewish organizations domestically support liberal policies and strict separation of church and state. Many of them cooperate with liberal Protestants.

⁶⁸ Hertzke, Allen D.: *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity*. University of Tennessee Press. Knoxville 1988, p. 5.

⁶⁹ Corbett/Corbett, op. cit., p. 345-348.

⁷⁰ They will be enumerated in the next part of the text.

⁷¹ More in: Corbett/Corbett, op. cit.

⁷² Ibidem, p. 339-349.

campaigning to elect representatives who share religious groups' views and goals. And yet, boycotts, demonstrations, letters, e-mails, and media efforts also prove to be quite effective.

While lobbying, understood as "personal efforts to persuade public officials to support a particular view on some public issue"⁷³ is usually the most effective strategy, it is important to remember that churches and religious organizations have a substantial legal limitation on lobbying and other political activities. The most important limitation is included in the so-called Johnson Amendment, which is a provision in the U.S. tax code, since 1954, that prohibits all 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations from endorsing or opposing political candidates⁷⁴. Under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code religious groups and other public service organizations are tax exempt and can receive tax deductible contributions - as long as they do not draw any financial profits and do not devote a "substantial" part of their activities to attempts to influence legislation. They are also prohibited from "participation" or "intervention" in political campaigns on behalf of any candidate for public office. These requirements are called: the 'lobbying clause' and the 'electioneering clause'⁷⁵. However, while such rules do limit the political activities of religious groups, many authors stress that the vagueness of the requirements leaves a great deal of room for political activity anyway. Some scholars also point out that religious groups have developed ways to work within the letter of the law and still achieve their political goals⁷⁶. One of the examples is the fact that despite restrictions, a religious organization might distribute "report cards" or "scorecards" about candidates in an election. Although such reports do not explicitly endorse any candidate, they make it very obvious whom to consider the "good" candidate⁷⁷.

Religious interest groups can also choose between at least two strategies of lobbying: *home district pressure* (which does not depend on direct access to the legislator) and *classic insider strategies* (which are based on direct access to the legislator)⁷⁸. Most groups seem to use both strategies simultaneously. Among the activities related to *home district pressure*, there are: mass constituency mobilization (grassroots efforts), elite mobilization, direct electoral mobilization, and various media strategies. *Classic insider strategies* are more complicated and are based on the detailed work, including discussions on the language of the bills, providing possible amendments, creating coalitions, negotiating with opponents, providing information and arguments to congressional members⁷⁹. It seems that at the beginning of the existence of the RR, the organizations that constituted it, mastered mostly the first form, especially the grassroots efforts. However with time, many of them became professional enough to be able to influence the decision-making process through the classic insider strategies. It is worth mentioning that generally, the substantial problem for most religious interest groups is gaining access to the White House or Congress. However, in case of the RR the access was granted several times. The first time was during the Reagan administration when the White House appointed conservative coordinators for contacts with religious constituencies. Thanks to that the access for religious groups was funneled through a conservative filter⁸⁰.

There are two other important classifications of religious interest that should be presented here. The first one concerns the models of religious groups' activity in the public arena. The *witness* model "calls for the group to be a faithful witness, speaking truth to power, regardless of the policy impact the group has" and the *winning* model "calls for the group to have a substantial impact on the outcome of the policy process"⁸¹. Interestingly, in history, 3/4 of witnessing groups were church-based groups, while nearly 2/3

⁷³ Ibidem, p. 344.

⁷⁴ It is still valid although President Donald Trump wanted to revoke it. It will be discussed below.

⁷⁵ Corbett/Corbett, op. cit., p. 348.

⁷⁶ Ibidem, 349.

⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the Christian Coalition lost the tax-exempt status in 1996 - due to such activities.

⁷⁸ Corbett/Corbett, 349.

⁷⁹ Ibidem, 351.

⁸⁰ Ibidem, 355.

⁸¹ Zwier, Robert: "An Organizational Perspective on Religious Interest Groups". In: Stevenson, William R., Jr. (ed.): *Christian Political Activism at the Crossroads*. University Press of America. Lanham 1994, pp. 95-119. Cited in: Ibidem, p. 356.

of the winning groups were individual member groups⁸². Organizations constituting the RR usually represent the second model. Another important classification, stresses that there are two organizational types of religious interest groups: the church denomination, in which lobbying is incidental to other activities, and the direct-mail organization, in which members join for specifically political reasons (e.g. Christian Coalition)⁸³. The RR is definitely the second type.

Short History of the American Religious Right as an Interest Group

The creation of the American Christian Right is related to the so called “political awakening of evangelicals”. In fact, the movement was constructed by Protestant neo-fundamentalists who managed to politically mobilize a great number of conservative evangelical Christians⁸⁴. The first central organization of the movement was the Moral Majority. It was created in 1979 by Jerry Falwell and several members of the New Right wing within the Republican Party. The Republican Party eagerly welcomed new allies as it recognized an opportunity of creating a new voter base⁸⁵. Apart from the Moral Majority, which was soon replaced by Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition as the leading organization within the movement, many other groups and institutions were created: Christian Voice, Religious Roundtable, Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, Eagle Forum, Liberty Counsel, Council for National Policy, or American Coalition for Traditional Values.

In the 1990s the leaders of the Christian Right decided to broaden its base and invited all socially and religiously conservative Jews and Catholics to join the alliance⁸⁶. Since then “Christian Right” started to be called the “Religious Right”⁸⁷. At the moment the movement is an informal coalition of numerous groups, chiefly Evangelicals and Catholics. However, the core of the movement consists of fundamentalist Protestants. Therefore, most of its members are commissioned to evangelize and convert non-believers into the narrow version of Christianity, in which being born again is the most important. While the Catholics from the movement do not insist on the latter, they are commissioned to social conservatism⁸⁸ and reject “secular humanism” just like their fellow conservative Protestants.

⁸² Ibidem.

⁸³ Ibidem, p. 359.

⁸⁴ Currently, the terms „evangelical” and „fundamentalist” are often used interchangeably although fundamentalists significantly changed the character of American Evangelicalism.

⁸⁵ More in: Zunes, Stephen: “The Influence of the Christian Right on U.S. Middle East Policy”, *Middle East Policy* 12(2), 2005, p. 73 (6).

⁸⁶ More in: Watson, Justin: *Christian Coalition. Dreams of Restoration, Demand for Recognition*, St. Martin’s Press. Bloomsburg, PA 1999.

⁸⁷ Some authors still prefer to use the term Christian Right. Lee Marsden is one of them. He explains his decision stressing that the Christian Right comprises only of socially conservative Protestants and Catholics. Therefore, for him it is only a subgroup of the Religious Right, which is in his definition encompasses both conservative Christians (including evangelical Protestants, Catholics, Pentecostals, charismatics, fundamentalists, as well as sects and cults: Mormons, Moonies, Christian Scientists) and conservative non-Christians (Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists). Unlike Lee Marsden, I decided to use the term Religious Right due to several facts. First of all, the Christian Right changed its name to the “Religious Right” after broadening the base to include Catholic because traditionally Catholics were not called ‘Christian’ by the Protestant fundamentalists. The reason for not viewing Catholics as Christians was their acceptance of the authority of the Pope, not only the Bible, and their reluctance to go through a born-again experience. Since they were needed as allies, the rhetoric eased but even though fundamentalist Protestants within the movements stopped publically stressing their denial to call Catholics “Christians”, many publications (e.g. “The Left Behind” series) indicate it still is the case. Additionally, Marsden classifies Mormons and Christian Scientists (who recently also became a part of the movement) as Christian while other researchers see them as either non-Christian or a fringe of Protestantism. Thus, since it is so difficult to draw lines between what is viewed “Christian” or “non-Christian” within the movement, it seems more justified to me to use the term “Religious Right”.

⁸⁸ Marsden, op. cit.

The RR's groups, being mostly 'direct-mail religious interest groups' based on individual membership and focusing on the *winning* model of activity, have applied various kinds of pressure and lobbying strategies since the 1970s - in order to achieve their goals and influence state policies⁸⁹. Their methods have included: grassroots activities, distributing voter's guides, organizing conferences, seminars, rallies and campaigns, publishing "Congressional Report Card" and "Candidates Scorecard" (that contain information on how representatives voted), using public and private media, creating their own TV and radio channels or even broadcasting networks (to spread socio-political and religious ideas), organizing educational campaigns and creating new educational institutions (including schools, universities, institutes, museums), and - most importantly - direct lobbying. The organization through which the RR members have been most active in lobbying activities is the Council for National Policy (CNP). It was founded in 1981 by Tim LaHaye and although it is described as "an educational foundation organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code" most of its political activities have been aimed at working to strengthen political right in the US⁹⁰. While not much is known about CNP (as its members meet three times a year behind closed doors), it is no secret, however, that it gathers together the most powerful conservatives in the country⁹¹ and works as a forum for RR members' personal contacts with the Republican Party representatives.

Although the RR groups were primarily concerned with domestic politics (opposing: abortion, pornography, homosexual relations, feminism, the 'wall of separation' between church and state, sexual education in schools, teaching of evolution theory in schools, banning public prayers at schools, and social activities of the government), they soon engaged in the foreign policy debate. The areas of special interest to them were: Reagan's crusade against the 'evil empire', support for national defense, and opposition to the UN⁹².

Ideas Shaping Religious Right Foreign Policy Agenda

Some of the most important theological streams that have shaped the vision and goals of the RR are Christian Nationalism and Christian Zionism⁹³. While the second one is most visible in the foreign policy approach, the first one shapes both, domestic political views (what is commonly known) as well as elements of the foreign policy vision.

Christian Nationalism incorporates concepts of theocracy known as Dominion Theology and Reconstructionism⁹⁴. Dominion Theology stresses the verses from the first chapter of the Book of Genesis (1:26-28), in which God gives humanity dominion over His creation (including natural resources provided by God for the human race). As Marsden points out, instead of interpreting these verses as an imperative for humanity to be a good steward of the Earth, dominionists use it to insist on Christian domination of the political and economic system. According to their view, only Christians are capable of governing according to God's will, and therefore non-Christians should be excluded from the political processes. Reconstructionists also emphasize the necessity for Christians to 'subdue' and 'exercise dominion' over the earth. What is more, according to their view, the US and the whole world can be

⁸⁹ I wrote more about specific methods of the RR in: Napierała, Paulina: "The Strategy of the Religious Right: Christian Fiction or Political Agitation?". *Ad Americam* 13, 2012, pp. 45-65.

⁹⁰ Kirkpatrick, David D.: "Christian Right Labors to Find '08 Candidate." *New York Times*, 2007, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/us/politics/25secret.html>.

⁹¹ Kirkpatrick, David D.: "The 2004 Campaign: The Conservatives: Club of the Most Powerful Gathers in Strictest Privacy", *New York Times*, 2004, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/28/us/2004-campaign-conservatives-club-most-powerful-gathers-strictest-privacy.html>

⁹² Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy Today*, 2010, retrieved 20.02.2018 from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/04/14/the-christian-right-and-us-foreign-policy-today/>.

⁹³ More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake...*, op. cit.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

rescued from disaster not only by having Christians controlling government but also by applying the Old Testament law⁹⁵. Dominionist and Reconstructionist thinking has efficacy in foreign policy because it considers Christian governance necessary for a fallen world, and postulates seeking Christian dominion not only over America (which should become theocratic) but also over the whole world. According to this view, it is a holy responsibility to reclaim the land for Christ, to start a conquest of the world for the Gospel (in accordance with what God commissioned Christians for)⁹⁶.

Most of the researchers interested in the RR's foreign policy goals, including Lee Marsden, stress however that the Christian Zionist approach is much more influential in this area⁹⁷. Most generally, Christian Zionism is a belief that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, is in accordance with Biblical Prophecy. Christian Zionists believe that the state of Israel is a fundamental part of God's plan and it is essential for it to survive and thrive. Therefore, it should be granted an unconditional support from the USA. As Jerry Falwell put it in 1978: "I believe that if we fail to protect Israel we will cease to be important to God . . . we can and must be involved in guiding America towards a biblical position regarding her stand on Israel"⁹⁸. Yet, it is important to note that Christian Zionism was not "invented" by the RR. As Samuel Goldman argues, "Christian Zionism is an older feature of American culture than most citizens and even some scholars recognize. Its sources stretch back to the English Reformation—and, in some ways, to the early church"⁹⁹. He adds that there were Christian Zionists in the USA even before Theodor Herzl founded the formal Zionist movement. However, the term was introduced into the public debate around 1980 – after the founding of International Christian Embassy whose members protested Western governments refusal to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital¹⁰⁰. And although originally it was not the main area of concern for Moral Majority, Jerry Falwell soon incorporated the idea in order to integrate religious conservatives interested in the prophecy literature. In the end "[i]t became a characteristic feature of 'the new Christian Right' that helped define the Reagan era"¹⁰¹.

Usually scholars distinguish two common approaches by which Christian Zionists justify their unconditional support for Israel. One of them is the belief based on the words found in the Book of Genesis 12:3, "I will bless those who bless you, whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed through you"¹⁰². The second approach is based on dispensationalist theology, which

⁹⁵ Ibidem. Dominionists are also convinced that the Old Testament laws should be still applicable, with punishments for breaking the Ten Commandments. So called *hard dominionists*, including Reconstructionists call for a theocratic state, where such 'offenses' as abortion, homosexuality, adultery could be punished even with death penalty. On the other hand, so called *soft dominionists* want to work within the existing political system to achieve their goals.

⁹⁶ Ibidem.

⁹⁷ As a subgroup of the RR movement, Christian Zionists became more visible and effective after the reactivation of CUFI (Christians United for Israel) in 2006 by John Haggee. It was originally established in 1992 by David Lewis but became inactive.

⁹⁸ As quoted in: Urban, Hugh B.: *America, Left Behind. Bush, the Neoconservatives, and Evangelical Christian Fiction*, 2006, retrived 10.09.2007 from: <http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2006/2006-2.html>.

⁹⁹ Goldman, Samuel: *God's Country. Christian Zionism in America*. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia 2018, p. 167.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 168.

¹⁰² This approach has been used not only by Protestant fundamentalist, but by other groups of Christian Zionists as well. The biblical argument used here, however, has produced much disagreement from both Christians and non-Christians. According to some Old Testament scholars, the State of Israel was established without the blessings of God because it was established by force, and the Torah tells its believers not to ascend to the Holy Land as a group using force. More in: Haija, Rammy M.: "The Armagedon Lobby: Dispensationalist Christian Zionism and the Shaping of US Policy Towards Israel-Palestine". *Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 5(1), 2006, pp.75-95. Also available at: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/199773/pdf>.

presents literal and predictive approach to the Bible and teaches that we are living in the end-times. I will focus on the latter one, since it is most popular among American conservative Evangelicals¹⁰³.

The theological system called “premillennial dispensationalism” emerged during the early 19th century in England. It was developed by Edward Irving and an Irish clergyman and John Nelson Darby who came to America from Plymouth, England. It gained popularity among American Protestant fundamentalists through the notes of the Scofield Reference Bible¹⁰⁴. Pre-millennialism is the belief that Christ will literally reign on the earth for 1,000 years at his Second Coming. His return, defeat of Antichrist and establishment of the millennial kingdom is expected soon due to the weak nature of man¹⁰⁵. Darby added some unique features to pre-millennialism¹⁰⁶: he emphasized such teachings as “the rapture”¹⁰⁷, he focused on the rise of the Antichrist, the Battle of Armageddon and the central role that a revived nation-state of Israel would play during the latter days. He claimed that an actual Jewish state called Israel would become the central instrument for God to fulfill His plans. What is important, he came to believe that the Old Testament refers only to the Jews, not to the Christians¹⁰⁸. He thus saw a clear distinction between Israel and the “church” and stressed that during the millennial kingdom God would fulfill all His unconditional promises with Israel¹⁰⁹.

Additionally, Darby divided biblical history into a number of successive economies or administrations, called dispensations¹¹⁰. According to this theology, the last dispensation of a literal, earthly 1000-year Millennial Kingdom is very near. The signs that indicate “the end of times” are such facts as the establishment of the state of Israel and buildup of armies of the countries that are Israel’s foes. What is even more important, during the Great Tribulation¹¹¹, as dispensationalists believe, 144,000 Jews will convert to Christianity¹¹². This conversion will reveal to them the true intentions of the Antichrist and they will bring Christian faith to all non-believers who were not “raptured”. Additionally, the converted Jews will meet the Antichrist for the final battle known as Armageddon and they will defeat him. After this battle Jesus will return and to defeat Satan and establish His Kingdom¹¹³.

The logical outcome of these beliefs is, of course, a very protective attitude toward the modern State of Israel. It is, however, important to remember that, despite the unconditional support for the State of

¹⁰³ I discussed this topic more thoroughly in: Napierała, Paulina: “Christian Zionism and Its Influence on American Foreign Policy”. In: Mania, Andrzej / Laidler, Paweł / Wordliczek, Łukasz (eds.): *U.S. Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanisms and Practice*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Kraków 2007, pp. 539-548, where I focused only on Christian Zionism, leaving out other aspects of the RR’s influence on U.S. foreign policy.

¹⁰⁴ More in: Marsden, George M.: *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism*. W.B. Eerdmans. Grand Rapids, Mich., 1991; Lienesch, Michael: *Redeeming America. Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right*. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill 1993.

¹⁰⁵ It is distinct from the other forms of Christian eschatology such as amillennialism or postmillennialism. The first one views the millennial rule as figurative and non-temporal, the second as occurring prior to the Second Coming of Christ. More on premillennialism in: *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁶ Wagner, Donald: “Christian Zionists, Israel and The ‘Second Coming’”, *Daily Star*, 2003, retrieved: 10.01.2018 from: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4930.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ In conservative Protestant eschatology, rapture is the name given to the event in which Jesus will descend from Heaven and take the true Christians (together with their bodies) up to Heaven.

¹⁰⁸ Therefore, a “church” in a figurative sense cannot be considered as “Israel” or the chosen people. More in: Lasky, Ed: *Evangelicals and Israel: An Interview with David Brog*, 2006, retrived: 10.01.2018 from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/05/evangelicals_and_israel_an_int.html.

¹⁰⁹ Vlach, Michael J.: What is Dispensationalism?, retrived: 10.05.2007 from: <http://www.theologicalstudies.org/disp.html>.

¹¹⁰ A dispensation, according to Darby’s teachings, is a period in which human beings are tested in their obedience to God. More in: Tołwiński, Jan: *Kształtowanie się poglądów amerykańskiego fundamentalizmu protestanckiego od I wojny światowej*, Fundacja Chrześcijańskiej Kultury i Oświaty, Warszawa 2000.

¹¹¹ A period mentioned by Jesus in the Olivet discourse as a sign that would occur in the end times. During this time everyone, according to this eschatology, will experience worldwide hardships, disasters, famine, war, pain, and suffering. Before the Second Coming the population of the world is expected to be seriously reduced.

¹¹² The rest of them will be condemned and lost. More in: *Ibidem*.

¹¹³ More in: Haija, op.cit.

Israel, Christian Zionism, does not necessarily entail sympathy for the Jews as a nation or for Judaism as a religion. Main representatives of Christian Zionism in the USA, such as Hal Lindsay or Pat Robertson have been known for their anti-Semitic remarks¹¹⁴. All in all, for the prophecy to be fulfilled a significant number of Jews must accept Jesus as their Messiah.

The above described theological ideas, while being interpreted and adapted to particular historical and geo-political events, have shaped the RR's foreign policy goals since the movement's creation in the 1970s.

Religious Right's Foreign Policy Aims

The outcome of these ideas is a very specific attitude towards the U.S. foreign policy. For example, dominionism together with the idea that assumes the perception of the US as the chosen nation (which will reclaim the world for Christ), or even as 'an armed hand of God' that will fight the forces of Evil around the world, is the core reason for postulating strong national defense. However, although strengthening the national defense against the forces perceived as being associated with Evil seems to have been an unchanged element of the RR's foreign policy goals, the personification of Evil - due to the changing international context - has been shifting in time. In the course of history the 'Antichrist' was associated with the Soviet Union¹¹⁵, international organizations (EU, UN), Iraq and other Arab states or Islam¹¹⁶.

Christian Zionism, another idea shaping the RR's attitude toward U.S. foreign policy has certainly resulted in a strong support for Israel (both military and political). This includes promoting Israeli settlements, recognizing Jerusalem as the (undivided) capital of Israel or opposing any UN initiatives in favor of Palestinians. Lienesch stresses that there is no doubt that such goals are an output of the "millennial mentalities" and premillennial view of the world¹¹⁷. However, it is important to remember that at the beginning or its existence, the RR supported Israel rather because it was considered a defender against communism (then regarded as a major threat to Christianity) in the Middle East¹¹⁸. It was only after Jerry Falwell included Christian Zionism into the RR's rhetoric that this narration became the most important one in regard to Israel¹¹⁹.

Another outcome of the belief in a special role of America in the world as well as of the dispensationalist theology is the rejection of multilateralism in international relations as hindering the righteous actions of the USA. According to very specific dispensationalist reading of the Biblical prophecy concerning the period just before the Second Coming of Jesus, unilateralism is absolutely justified. The reason for that is a strong belief that unification is the way of the Beast to gain control over the world. In this vision Antichrist will lead a one-world government, trying to create the "New World Order". In Hal Lindsay's book "The Great Planet Earth" it was the European Economic Community (EEC) that represented the 10-headed beast referred to in the Book of Revelation. Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, on the other hand, recognized the 10-headed beast in the United Nations and popularized this view in the "Left Behind" series¹²⁰. They still argue that UN's restraint on U.S. unilateral actions and its

¹¹⁴ Hal Lindsay several times implied that "slaughter of Jews who do not accept Christ during the last days will be much more than Holocaust". It is also interesting to follow Gary DeMar's arguments in: DeMar, Gary: *When All Else Fails, Use the "A" Word – Anti-Semitism!*, 2005, retrieved: 10.05.2007 from: <http://www.americanvision.org/articlearchive/05-31-05.asp>.

¹¹⁵ Wald, Kenneth D.: *Religion and Politics in the United States*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2003, p. 210.

¹¹⁶ More in: Lienesch, op. cit.; Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake...*, op. cit.

¹¹⁷ Lienesch, op. cit., p. 224-225. However, he also notices that there is a small group of postmillennials within the Religious Right.

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 229-230.

¹¹⁹ More in: Goldman, op. cit.

¹²⁰ More in: Urban, op. cit.; Napierala: "The Strategy of the Religious Right: Christian Fiction or Political Agitation?", op. cit.

support of the rights of the Palestinians prove their vision to be correct. According to them, the UN's promotion of what is seen as liberal agenda (at odds with the Biblical order), e.g.: protecting the rights of women, gay and other sexual minority people or distributing condoms (to fight AIDS) additionally adds to their argument.

Dominion theology, while stressing the role of Christians in the world, provides additional arguments against the UN. According to dominionist beliefs, it is unacceptable to treat all religions equally. The UN does, so it must be a part of conspiracy against true Christians¹²¹. For the RR it represents the modern Babel Tower. Therefore, the UN and all its agencies are regarded as not trustworthy and any cooperation with them is considered a corruption of Biblical beliefs. What is more, the dominionist conviction that human beings were given control over the earth and nature by God makes it impossible to accept environmental policies of the UN or other international agencies. Arguing that there is an abundance of natural resources (provided by God), the RR members deny global warming and climate change. Just like Darwin's theory, the greenhouse effect is for them a liberal ideological demagoguery¹²².

As Lienesch points out, "practicing universalistic religion, Evangelicals are conscious of Christ's commission to carry their faith to all ends of the earth". At the same time "[a]s conservatives who subscribe to a strongly nationalistic brand of patriotism, they think of America as holding a parallel political responsibility to bring law and liberty to other lands. In combining these two callings, they have come to conceive of the U.S. as having a God-given mission to save other nations from religious backwardness and political corruption"¹²³. And although, this concept is not new in the history of the United States (Americans have thought of themselves as "the redeemer nation" since the late 18th century), scholars argue that the approach to foreign policy taken by the religious conservatives in the 20th century has been unique, because it consists "of a particularly confrontational and combative version of this redemptive international impulse"¹²⁴. Their view of the world is not only moralistic, but also highly dualistic, and frequently apocalyptic¹²⁵.

Summing up, since the creation of the RR, its foreign policy aims have included: opposition to communism (mostly in the 20th century), supporting Israel, postulating strong national security, combating Islam (especially after 9/11), opposing the UN as international conspiracy, as well as various UN agencies and its programs, including those preventing AIDS¹²⁶ and global warming, and those that are aimed at protecting sexual minorities and promoting family planning. The views of the RR on how to deal with the problem of prostitution and human trafficking around the world are also radically different than those presented by the UN¹²⁷. Additionally, the RR has been involved in fighting against what is considered by the movement as persecution of Christians around the world.

The Effects of the Religious Right's Involvement in the U.S. Foreign Policy

Ronald Reagan administration

At the beginning of its existence the main area in which the RR attempted to influence U.S. foreign policy was the crusade against the 'evil empire' and communism in the world. During the Reagan administration the members of the RR became strongly involved in support of most of the anti-communist actions as well as in fighting atheism in communist countries. While the latter aim was exercised mostly by

¹²¹ More in: Lienesch, op. cit., p. 238-240

¹²² More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake*, op. cit.

¹²³ Lienesch, op. cit., p. 195.

¹²⁴ Ibidem.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, p. 195-196.

¹²⁶ While providing treatment for AIDS is one of RR-affiliated NGOs' interest, UN programs advocating AIDS prevention with means other than abstinence are strongly rejected.

¹²⁷ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

supporting actions against persecution of Christians, the involvement in anti-communist actions took many different forms. For example, several members of the Council for National Policy (CNP) were engaged in supporting actions in Latin America, including covert military operations, also those concerning Nicaraguan Contras¹²⁸. At the same time the Moral Majority, the Freedom Council and the Heritage Foundation were cooperating with Reagan's Outreach Working Party on Central America, devising strategy and propaganda against communists in these countries (including assassinations)¹²⁹. What is important, during the fight against communism, the RR members represented and advocated a realist approach, stating that the abuse of rights is always relative. Therefore, they had no objections to the U.S. military actions or to the support of cruel regimes in Latin America. In fact, before Reagan was elected, representatives of the movement had criticized Jimmy Carter for his idealism and contrasted it to the (much more promising) realism proposed by Reagan. They postulated, what they called a "constructive engagement"¹³⁰.

With this attitude, they forged coalition with political conservatives in order to oppose international communism at all levels, including diplomatic and military ones¹³¹. However, although these coalitions and financial support had some material meaning for the Republican Party leaders, what was the most important for the Party at that time was the RR's symbolic language. The apocalyptic terminology and metaphors used by the movement's representatives, including such terms as "Redeemer nation" and "The Evil Empire" were adopted by politicians, and especially by Ronald Reagan. According to the Cold War researchers, he started to use such expressions instrumentally - in order to gain support for the administration's Cold War policy. The Soviet Union was commonly described as "Anti-Christian Adversary, atheistic and anti-individualistic" - "diplomatically deceitful and politically untrustworthy, a symbol of everything that America should act against, everything that it should avoid"¹³².

The rhetoric of the RR turned out to be quite helpful to Ronald Reagan who gained huge support for his anti-communist policies. What is interesting however, although these policies effectively worked in bringing the Cold War to an end, the RR members were extremely surprised that the Soviet Union actually collapsed. They even felt deceived by the government who did not inform them about the economic problems of the Evil Empire. Pat Robertson went as far as speculating that the Cold War might have been a deception, a "false war", maybe even a "conspiracy"¹³³. Surprisingly, the RR movement was quite ambivalent about the consequences of the collapse of communism. On the one hand, such turn of events could have been considered a triumph for the West, as well as an opportunity to spread Christianity, especially in Eastern Europe. On the other hand however, some RR members were pointing to the pervasiveness of secularism in the Western European social democracies - perceived as being almost as bad as the disease of communism itself¹³⁴. Consequently, after the fall of communism, the world looked less stable to the RR activists. They had to find new foreign policy goals at the time of turmoil, controversy and political and spiritual unrest¹³⁵.

Another area of activity during this period of history was the RR's strong engagement in the Middle East policy. At first it was also connected with the Cold War situation and opposition to the "Godless" communist influence in the region, but with time Christian Zionist ideas stated to play a major role. Among the most active and famous representatives of American Christian Zionism there were: Franklin Littell, Hal Lindsey, John Hagee, Tim LaHaye, Jerry Jenkins, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell (to name a

¹²⁸ More about covert operations lead by Oliver North and General John Singlaub as well as about Tim LaHaye's support for Reagan policy of arming the Nicaraguan Contras in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake...*, op. cit.

¹²⁹ Ibidem.

¹³⁰ Lienesch, op. cit., p. 218.

¹³¹ Ibidem, p. 196.

¹³² Ibidem, p. 211.

¹³³ Ibidem, p. 222.

¹³⁴ Ibidem, p. 223.

¹³⁵ Ibidem.

few). They created and operated various Christian Zionist organizations¹³⁶ which were designed to: promote Israel, generate material help during Israel's military conflicts, provide financial help to the Israeli settlers, and to pressure U.S. government to support Israel in all possible ways.

According to Professor Paul Rogers, it was actually already the Six-Day War in 1967 that gave impetus to the Christian Zionists' political engagement¹³⁷. Shortly after the war in June of 1967 Franklin Littell established Christians Concerned for Israel (CCI)¹³⁸. Its creation preceded the creation of Moral Majority, however Jerry Falwell joined forces with Christian Zionists soon after his organization entered the American political scene. CCI was created because Christian Zionists were concerned with the fact that the France's alliance with Israel in the 1950s and 1960s was maintained out of strategic interests of retaining control over the Suez Canal. They believed that there should be an unconditional alliance with Israel, based not on political motivations but on religious foundations¹³⁹. Jerry Falwell and his followers supported this claim.

One of the first efforts by Christian Zionists to influence a U.S. foreign policy decision occurred in March 1977, before the RR was fully organized. The reason for this action was President Carter's statement that Palestinians deserve a right to their homeland. Immediately, the pro-Israel lobby responded and mobilized Evangelicals, many of whom later formed the RR. They used ads in major U.S. newspapers to stress their belief that Israel is for the Jewish people. The text stated: "The time has come for evangelical Christians to affirm their belief in biblical prophecy and Israel's divine right to the land." At the end they added: "We affirm as evangelicals our belief in the promised land to the Jewish people ... We would view with grave concern any effort to carve out of the Jewish homeland another nation or political entity"¹⁴⁰. Soon after that, Littell and CCI engaged themselves in the campaign opposing the sale of F-15s and other reconnaissance equipment to the U.S. Middle East ally, Saudi Arabia. What is interesting, even though Israel and Israel lobby in the USA applied heavy pressure on Congress and on President Carter's administration to convince them to withdraw the sale commitment, the action remained unsuccessful. The situation changed only after the CCI and considerable number of the future members of the RR stepped in and applied evangelical pressure. It was Franklin Littell who helped organize a considerable number of Christians to head to Washington D.C. and call on the Carter administration to block the sale¹⁴¹. This situation served as an example for the newly created RR, and convinced its members that in some specific circumstances the efforts of a religious interest group can actually be taken into consideration during the foreign policy decision-making process. This encouraged them to take more actions.

Another attempt by Christian Zionists to influence U.S. foreign policy came about during the mobilization in Washington against the sale of AWACS to the Saudis in 1980s¹⁴². However, this time the movement was not so successful. Although Reagan expressed his belief in a final Battle of Armageddon on several public occasions and although his administration organized a series of seminars in cooperation with the Christian Right (and with the assistance from the pro-Israel lobby), the Reagan administration decided to sell AWACS-equipped planes to Saudi Arabia anyway. He argued that by contributing to the

¹³⁶ Among the most important Christian Zionism organizations there were: Stand for Israel, International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ), International Christian Zionist Center, Bridges for Peace, Exobus, Christian Friends of Israel, or lately, Christians United for Israel. In this text I will not discuss the activities of all of them but only those that have concentrated directly on lobbying the U.S. government.

¹³⁷ Rogers, Paul: *Christian Zionists And Neocons: A Heavenly Marriage*, 2005, retrieved: 10.01.2018 from: http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_2329.jsp.

¹³⁸ American Jewish Archives Collection: *Dr. Franklin Little on Israel and Christian-Jewish Dialogue*, retrieved: 10.03.2018 from: <http://collections.americanjewisharchives.org/ms/ms0603/cd1077.pdf>

¹³⁹ Haija, op. cit., p. 78.

¹⁴⁰ As quoted in: Wagner, Donald: "Bible and Sword: US Christian Zionists Discover Israel". Daily Star, 2003, retrieved: 10.01.2018 from: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4950.htm>.

¹⁴¹ Haija, op. cit., p. 79. Some of the cases mentioned here were also analyzed in my previous articles on Christian Zionism and on religion in U.S. Middle East policy.

¹⁴² Haija, op.cit, p. 79.

stability of the area, such a sale also improves Israeli security. This decision seems to prove that Reagan treatment of RR was instrumental (just like in the case of the Cold War rhetoric). This might seem unexpected for those who only pay attention to Ronald Reagan's verbal expressions of support for the RR's values.

The fact that this time Christian Zionists did not manage to block the sale, led them to a very important decision. Franklin Littell decided to unite American Christian Zionists under the National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI). Jerry Falwell soon decided to join forces with the new organization and it soon became associated with the Moral Majority. Not long after its creation, the NCLCI took part in the campaign, which postulated a repeal of UN Resolution 3379. The Resolution which was introduced at the Conference on Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries in Lima, Peru, in August 1975, and adopted by UN General Assembly, stated that "Zionism is a form of racism and discrimination"¹⁴³. The efforts towards repealing UN Resolution 3379 were very intense, especially in the mid-1980s. Interestingly, the efforts of Israeli lobby groups requesting the US to exert pressure on the UN remained ineffective. As previously, it was only when the Christian-Right lobby joined the campaign that officials in Washington began responding to the pressure. In the end, the efforts proved to be fruitful and the resolution condemning Zionism was overturned in 1991 (during George H.W. Bush administration). This time Christian Zionists could consider themselves successful again. It was another situation in which they managed to exert pressure on U.S. government.

Apart from these two main areas of the RR's foreign policy activity (anti-communist and pro-Israel policies) during this first period, the movement was also engaged in battles against the UN. In these "moral issues" campaigns, the RR tried to "avoid liberal legislation being introduced via the back door by United Nations' advocacy of women's' and gay rights"¹⁴⁴. The actions against the UN were possible and productive to some extent thanks to getting funding from prominent businessmen, donors and even televangelists. Most active in this area were the Concerned Women of America's who organized a campaign in opposition to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)¹⁴⁵.

Among other RR groups that were also active in the field of foreign policy at that time there were: the Institute on Religion and Democracy and the Family Research Council¹⁴⁶. Both of them were set up during the Reagan administration in 1981 and 1983. Family Research Council used rapid alerts and rapid action calls to supporters and allies of impeding legislation (senators, congressional representatives, local politicians and constituencies whose votes mattered for those representatives). The most active and powerful was, however, the afore mentioned, secretive organization known as the Council for National Policy (CNP), established in 1981. It sought to include not only RR activists and leaders, but also business magnates, financiers, corporate executives, media moguls, judges, conservative Republicans and other conservative politicians committed to "free enterprise system, a strong national defense, and support for traditional western values". It focused mostly on finding personal relations and shared interest to achieve common goals¹⁴⁷. Nevertheless, it is also important to remember about such organizations as the Religious Roundtable, Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and Christian Voice which since the creation of the movement in the late 70s were also interested in influencing foreign policy decisions¹⁴⁸. And although during this period the dominating topics in the programs of these organizations included strong national defense and anti-communism, their women members were also determined to stop UN's "liberal agenda".

What is the most important about the first period of the RR foreign policy engagement is that during the Reagan administration the RR leaders were granted unprecedented access to the White House, especially through CNP¹⁴⁹. Therefore, despite the fact that the President did not always prove to be a

¹⁴³ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁴ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁴⁵ More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake...*, op. cit.

¹⁴⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁹ Ibidem.

“loyal ally” to the movement as he concentrated mostly on the use of the RR’s rhetoric, he did contribute to its growth and permanent presence in the U.S. politics.

George H.W. Bush administration and Bill Clinton administration

Although the RR remained an important player on the American political scene and although its lobbying efforts were facilitated by the existence of such organizations as CNP (that grew in strength), the easy access to the White House enjoyed by the movement so far was being limited by Reagan’s successors in the White House¹⁵⁰. George H.W. Bush was never on good terms with the RR. Pat Robertson even decided to run against him during the presidential elections - partly to show the RR’s dissatisfaction with his candidacy. When Bush Senior won the Republican Party nomination, he formally confirmed his ties to RR, knowing it was a necessary strategy, but never felt comfortable about it and showed little enthusiasm for consultation with the representatives of the movement. Instead, he nominated his son, G.W. Bush Jr., to be a liaison with the movement. Once Bush Senior was elected President, the RR’s influence on administration diminished despite previous declarations. Nevertheless, some of the movement’s initiatives, initiated much earlier, such as repealing the UN resolution on Zionism, were successfully completed during this period.

During the Clinton administration the RR’ access to the executive was even more limited. However, it was also during this time that Newt Gingrich wrote “Contract with the American People” a Republican manifesto. Thus, religious conservatives felt that they can attempt to influence foreign policy through the Republican Congress instead of the White House. While being in strong opposition to the President, the movement went through the process of intense mobilization and reorganization. The leading role within the RR was assumed by the Christian Coalition¹⁵¹. It was at that time that the new operational director, Ralph Reed advised Pat Robertson to ‘broaden the net’ and attract more Catholics into the movement. According to Lee Marsden, the RR “eventually re-emerged as a significant foreign policy actor towards the end of the Clinton presidency when it spearheaded a campaign with neoconservatives and civil liberties organizations for religious freedom in Sudan”¹⁵². It was a sign that the group was still active, cooperating behind the scenes with conservative politicians, still trying to influence politics, including the field of foreign policy. At that time the RR concentrated mostly on grassroots activities, reorganized the movement¹⁵³, managed to mobilized the conservative base against the liberal president and did not surrender or stop attempting to influence the state’s decisions.

G.W. Bush administration

The situation took a positive turn for the RR when G.W. Bush Jr. decided to run for President. Since the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004, the influence of the movement has been stronger than ever. The support granted by the RR to G.W. Bush helped him win elections¹⁵⁴ and made him the movement’s debtor. However, as Professor Duane Oldfield notices, it was not only the election of a president with close ties to the movement that helped make the RR a significant player in U.S. foreign policy in 2000s. It was also the growth of its grassroots organizational strength, and the development of an alliance with neoconservatives, who came to play a crucial role in G.W. Bush’s administration¹⁵⁵. Lee Marsden also stresses the grassroots efforts but he additionally points to the ability of RR members to enter many

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁵¹ More in: Watson, op. cit.

¹⁵² Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁵³ More in: Watson, op. cit.

¹⁵⁴ Wallis, Jim: *God’s Politics. Why the Right Gets in Wrong and the Left doesn’t Get it*. Harper. San Francisco 2005, pp. xvi.

¹⁵⁵ Oldfield, Duane M.: *The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism: The Christian Right’s Influence and How to Counter It*, 2003, retrieved 10.01.2018 from:

http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/2/6/0/pages62607/p62607-2.php

regional divisions of the party personally. For him these were the most important factors contributing to the RR's success. He explains that it was Robertson's Christian Coalition (mostly active during the Clinton administration) that showed the way to other RR's organizations by successfully infiltrating the Republican Party and its supporters taking over numerous state parties¹⁵⁶. Although Oldfield would agree, in his opinion the alliance with neoconservatives within the Bush's administration was more important in making RR's access to power possible¹⁵⁷.

Other authors additionally point out that the links between neoconservative intellectuals and the RR representatives became visible already in 1997, when the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was born. It united conservative leaders around a call for a much more aggressive U.S. foreign policy (including forceful action against Iraq). The election of George W. Bush and the confusion following 9/11 allowed neoconservative intellectuals led by Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and the members of the PNAC to seize the reins of U.S. foreign policy¹⁵⁸. It was also the 9/11 that made the RR more useful allies to the neoconservatives - as their rhetoric could help justify the "war on terror" and the attack on Iraq. And so the RR, was not only utilized by Karl Rove to engineer George W. Bush's victories in the 2000 and 2004 election but also given a special role in foreign policy after 9/11.

The RR's involvement in advocating the "war on terror", however, was not as meaningful as the public opinion might have expected. The wide use of the religious language by politicians is a misleading argument in the debate on the role of the RR in Bush's foreign policy. In fact the use of the RR rhetoric by politicians who supported the war in Iraq was rather symbolic. The decision concerning the war was made without the advice of the RR leaders. Therefore, specialists argue that although at first sight it might seem that the "war on terror" campaign was the most significant achievement of the movement at that time, in fact the RR's rhetoric was only used instrumentally - to support neoconservative decisions. It does not mean however that the movement did not influence any foreign policy decisions in the early 2000s¹⁵⁹. The RR's other activities and other areas of interest made its influence on the U.S. foreign policy during the G.W. Bush's administration significant. Therefore, it is much more important to examine those other aspects of the RR's foreign involvement.

The involvement in new areas of the U.S. foreign policy was possible thanks to G.W. Bush's nominations and appointments of the RR members to administration, judiciary, military and even to the Supreme Court. As most scholars suspect, these nominations were probably a form of a reward for the movement's support during the elections. Additionally, President Bush welcomed the RR's leaders into the White House, holding frequent meetings and consultations with them as well as weekly conference calls to discuss administration policy¹⁶⁰. G.W. Bush had learned how to cooperate with the RR during his father's campaign when he was made a liaison to the movement. Thus, he did not underappreciate CNP meetings, which enabled conservatives to form coalitions within this structure. These meetings gave him a chance to profit from these coalitions, while often providing the movement with greater access to administration.

As specialists stress, although the President could not keep all the promises he gave to the RR during his presidential campaign, his first effort was to establish the Faith Based and Community Initiative program¹⁶¹. This policy can be defined as "efforts by the federal government to broaden funding and support for the charitable efforts of religious organization"¹⁶². The program enabled faith-based organizations, largely connected with RR¹⁶³ to bid for federal funding to deliver social and medical

¹⁵⁶ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁵⁷ Oldfield, op. cit.

¹⁵⁸ Urban, op. cit.

¹⁵⁹ More in: Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁶⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁶¹ More in: Rozell, Mark J.: "Bush and the Christian Right: The Triumph of Pragmatism". In: Rozell, Mark J. / Whitney, Gleaves (eds.): *Religion and the Bush Presidency*. Palgrave. New York 2007.

¹⁶² Michelman, Scott M.: "Faith-Based Initiatives". *Harvard Journal on Legislation* 39, 2002, p. 475.

¹⁶³ More in: Kuo, David J.: *Tempting Faith. An Inside Story of Political Seduction*. Free Press. New York 2006.

programs not only at home but also abroad¹⁶⁴. In his first month as president, G.W. Bush signed Executive Orders 13198 and 13199 (on 29 January, 2001), creating the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (WHFBO) and establishing Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCIs) in five federal departments. These centers were mainly concerned with domestic affairs, however, along with the White House, United States Agency for International Development USAID became an important target for the reform. In 2001 Andrew Natsios, a former vice president of World Vision, was appointed USAID administrator and the Executive Order 13280 (12 December, 2002) introduced a faith-based center (CFBCI) also in USAID. Additionally, in 2004, the so-called “Final Rule” on participation by religious organizations in USAID programs was introduced. This rule secured the possibility of (even pervasively) “sectarian” organizations to compete for funding, even if their development or humanitarian operations were combined with “inherently religious activities” such as worship, religious instruction or proselytization. They only had to promise that religious activities would be separated in time or location from their USAID-funded activities¹⁶⁵. Soon they received large amounts of money to operate their programs¹⁶⁶.

The policy was very controversial both, constitutionally and politically. Numerous researchers and politicians have suggested that Bush’s policy was an attempt to undermine church and state separation through executive fiat. The Congress and the Senate did not accept the bills concerning faith-based policy due to lack of adequate safeguards to protect religious freedom of the recipients and employees of the federally funded faith-based organizations. Therefore, G.W. Bush introduced this policy through his executive orders. Although some commentators did not see any danger in providing religious organization with the possibility of playing a bigger role in caring for the poor (as it might have look on the surface), the group of scholars who predicted long-term effects of such policy on the interpretation of the religious clauses of First Amendment turned out to be right¹⁶⁷. The return to the specifically understood accommodationist interpretation was possible also due to numerous conservative nominations granted by G.W. Bush to his supporters, including: Tim Towey, John Ashcroft, Dick Arme, Tom deLay, Frank Wolf, Chris Smith, Michael Pence, Roy Blunt, Rick Santorum and especially John Roberts and Samuel Alito who entered the Supreme Court. The effects of these changes for foreign policy were also significant – not only in terms of the funds that were awarded to religious organizations but also due to the message that was sent to the world: “Christian organizations are being preferred as partners of the U.S. government in implementing a number of foreign policy programs.”

These successes led to the RR’s increased desire to influence foreign policy on a bigger scale. Organizations such as Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, the Institute on Religion and Democracy, and the Eagle Forum turned their attention towards seeking to advance their socially conservative moral values in the United Nations and World Congress of Families¹⁶⁸. The World Congress of Families (WCF) was active organizing large international “pro-family” conventions, and in fact bringing together activists engaged in anti-LGBT extremism. The group, together with its dozens of partner organizations, was widely promoting anti-LGBT legislation abroad, including in Russia and several African countries¹⁶⁹. What is more, not only did the RR organizations apply for more and more faith-based initiative funding to deliver humanitarian assistance abroad (bound

¹⁶⁴ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.; Bettiza, op. cit., pp. 205-212.

¹⁶⁵ Bettiza, op. cit., p. 206-207.

¹⁶⁶ More in Bettiza, op. cit.

¹⁶⁷ More in: Napierała, Paulina: *Religia i polityka w USA. Faith-based initiatives w okresie prezydentury G.W. Busha*. WUJ. Kraków 2013.

¹⁶⁸ WCF was formed in 1997 and is active worldwide, regularly organizing “large international ‘pro-family’ conventions”. More in: The Human Rights Campaign Report, 2014, retrived: 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/08/hrc-report-examines-world-congress-of-families-anti-gay-influence-extremism/>.

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem. More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God’s Sake...*, op. cit

with evangelizing)¹⁷⁰, but also promoted international programs that deny access to abortion or contraception, and worked against the UN agencies that promote sexual education and equality (undermining women's rights in poor countries). Additionally, they tried to minimize the discussions on the impact of global warming¹⁷¹. All these actions were in accordance with dominionist and Reconstructionist approaches, which apart from calling for Christian dominance, also claim that humanity should rule over all nature and creation. What made the RR's efforts to advance such an agenda more effective was the fact that Bush granted the RR organizations a privileged NGO observer status at the United Nations and other international forums¹⁷².

The RR organizations also became strongly involved in what they called the fight for freedom of religion in the world (perceiving it in fact as a fight against real and imagined persecution of Christians). One of very important efforts of the movement during the G.W. Bush administration was persuading the President to strongly endorse a Religious Freedom Act¹⁷³, which required the U.S. government to promote religious freedom as a foreign policy of the United States. The RR members viewed themselves as the protectors of Christians around the world and did not pay attention to other religious groups that were prone to persecution. Thanks to President's endorsement they received tools to act according to their conviction.

Additionally, they successfully persuaded G.W. Bush to introduce the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which pledged \$15 billion to AIDS/HIV relief in Africa. As researchers estimate, at least one third of this amount was directed to 'abstinence only' programs. What is more, the programs promoted by PEPFAR were increasingly carried out by RR organizations such as Operation Blessing, World Vision and Samaritan's Purse, which were often accused of undermining the boundaries of church state¹⁷⁴. G.W. Bush also re-instituted the so called "global gag rule", which is a U.S. government policy that blocks U.S. federal funding for non-governmental organizations that provide abortion counselling or referrals, advocate to decriminalize abortion or expand abortion services¹⁷⁵. The RR perceived it as the movement's success. However, although since 2001 all family planning organizations had to follow a "global gag rule", G.W. Bush soon exempted his H.I.V./AIDS program from the rule (to the movement's discontent)¹⁷⁶.

As mentioned before, the "war on terror" was not the major foreign policy achievement of the movement, although the rhetoric concerning this issue was the most apparent sign of the RR's presence in the U.S. politics. What is crucial here is that spreading religious arguments concerning the "war on terror" was exercised not only in order to support the government's campaign after 9/11, but also to advance RR's own agenda. The movement's leaders were depicting Islam as the major enemy and deadly threat to the U.S. in order to pressure the government on introducing such rules (connected with the Religious Freedom Act) that would give the RR organizations opportunity to proselytize in Muslim countries. Researchers agree that Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell or Hal Lindsay played a crucial role in planting

¹⁷⁰ Office of Inspector General (OIG) has calculated that between 2006 and 2007 the amount USAID awarded to faith-based groups continued to rise from \$552 million to \$586 million. During those two years, USAID counted 512 assistance agreements with 136 faith-based organizations. Bettiza, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁷¹ More in: Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake*, op. cit.

¹⁷² More in: Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁷³ The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 was passed to advocate on the behalf of the individuals viewed as persecuted in foreign countries on the account of religion. The Act was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 27, 1998. One of the reasons for the act was the situation in Southern Sudan. It was one of the issues in which RR members got strongly involved during the Clinton administration, acting behind the scenes. Due to many controversies around the act, including the RR involvement, on December 16, 2016, Barack Obama signed into law the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, which amends the 1998 Act by specifically extending protection to non-theists as well as those who do not claim any particular religion.

¹⁷⁴ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁵ The policy was enacted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, rescinded by Bill Clinton in January 1993, re-instituted in January 2001 as George W. Bush took office, rescinded on January 23, 2009, as Barack Obama took office and reinstated on January 23, 2017, as Donald Trump assumed the office.

¹⁷⁶ More in: Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.; Bettiza, op. cit.

Islamophobia in the U.S. and abroad through their sermons, broadcasts, writings and briefings. The result of their rhetorical exercises was that the “war on terror” became synonymous to the “war on Islam”¹⁷⁷. This led to creating an image of the U.S. army as a Christian army fighting Islam. In turn it produced serious (diplomatic) problems for non-Christian U.S. allies.

Nevertheless, Lee Marsden stresses that on “the big foreign policy decisions in the post 9/11 world”, the RR “became cheerleaders rather than influencers of US foreign policy”. As many researchers noticed, while Falwell, Robertson and Graham demonized Islam, the president (at least in public speeches) sought to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims”, emphasizing shared values. The decision to go to war with Iraq was definitely made on perceptions of national interest rather than religious grounds¹⁷⁸. Nonetheless, moral justification of war provided by the RR leaders was very useful to the government. A specifically understood ‘just war’ argument constructed by the RR leaders, who remained the strongest advocates and supporters of the war, although used instrumentally, served well, undermining the opinion given by the Pope and mainline US churches¹⁷⁹.

Although Marsden stresses that the RR’s influence was meaningful only in the areas regarded by the government as less important than “big politics”, it is important to remember about Christian Zionists’ political activity, which constantly oscillated around the “big policy issues”. Their influence on the U.S. Middle East policy, as some authors stress, became even stronger than that of AIPAC’s¹⁸⁰. While, just like the rest of the RR movement, Christian Zionists did not have much access to the White House after the end of Reagan presidency, the situation radically changed after the election of President George W. Bush. During a “60 Minutes” interview in October 2002 Jerry Falwell publicly expressed his deep belief that President is on the right side regarding the Israel issue. He said: “I think now we can count on President Bush’s to do the right thing for Israel every time”¹⁸¹. And indeed, the influence of Christian Zionism on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy concerning Middle East during the Bush administration became much more noticeable. Researchers generally agree that Bush’s administration proved to be the most supportive towards Israel of all post-war administrations. However, some of them, including Lee Marsden, are not entirely sure “to what extent this was due to Christian Right influence as opposed to Bush’s own objectives or neoconservative influence”¹⁸². Hugh Urban stresses that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the influence of neoconservatives from the influence of Christian Zionists. He explains that there is much similarity between the evangelical story of the imminent return of Christ in the Holy Land beginning a New Millennium and the neoconservative vision of a “New American Century”. In his opinion, this “subtle but powerful fit,” in the end helped to reinforce one another in very effective ways¹⁸³.

While it is probably impossible to draw clear and precise division lines between the Christian Zionists and neoconservative influence, it is possible to analyze at least several of Bush’s decisions concerning Israel. This analysis will show that although in many instances the arguments of both groups reinforced each other, sometimes Christian Zionists presented a different approach than neoconservatives and the government, and pressured (sometimes successfully) the administration to accept their perspective and their interests.

¹⁷⁷ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁸ More in: *ibidem*; and in: Betizza, op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁸⁰ The American Israel Public Affairs Committee has been known for pro-Israel lobbying, including: personal lobbying of policymakers, distributing records of how policymakers vote on issues related to Israel, keeping its members informed on policy matters related to Israel, influencing campaign contributions to policymakers. It is important to note that only some Jewish groups cooperate with the Religious Right concerning Israel while many of them are liberal and refuse to do it. More in: Hertzke, op. cit.; Corbett/Corbett, op. cit., p. 361.

¹⁸¹ Bob Simon interview with Jerry Falwell, “60 Minutes”, CBS, (October 6, 2002), quoted in: Haija, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁸² Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

¹⁸³ Urban, op. cit. Oldfield also stresses, the neoconservative idea of unilateralism was reinforced by Christian Zionists although roots of this conviction are different for both groups. Oldfield, op. cit.

Obviously, the area in which arguments of both groups were mutually reinforced was “the war on terror”. For Christian Zionists the war in Iraq was ‘just’ because all Arab countries should be regarded as enemies of Israel and therefore they should be weakened. That is how Israel’s war against the Palestinians and its other enemies was soon linked to the US ‘war on terrorism’¹⁸⁴. However, the examples of foreign policy decisions on which Christian Zionists did not agree with the administration include several issues¹⁸⁵.

For example, in 2002 President Bush did not react to the events in the Middle East as Christian Zionists expected, which caused their immediate reaction. In April 2002, following a Palestinian suicide attack in Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded several West Bank cities. International opinion opposed the action arguing that such destruction would not solve any problem. G.W. Bush initially avoided any comments, however, due to international pressure, finally made several appeals to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to cease the Israeli actions. The response from American Christian Zionists was immediate. According to Professor Wagner: “The Pro-Israel lobby, in coordination with the Christian Right, mobilized over 100,000 e-mail messages, calls and visits urging the President to avoid restraining Israel. The tactic worked. The president uttered not another word of criticism or caution, and Sharon continued the offensive.”¹⁸⁶

Another situation when Christian Zionists pressured the U.S. government to change its position concerning a particular issue happened after the attempted assassination of militant Palestinian Islamist Abdel Aziz Rantisi. In June 2003 in the helicopter raid the Israeli Air Force killed six people, but Rantisi escaped with nonlife-threatening injuries. President Bush initially condemned the action stating that the attack made fighting terrorism more difficult for the newly-appointed Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas¹⁸⁷. However, after Christian Zionists mobilized the RR’s constituents to send thousands of e-mails to the White House protesting the criticism, there was a notable change in tone by the President. Stephen Zunes emphasizes that a key element of these e-mails was the threat that if the pressure on Israel continued, religious conservatives supporting the RR would stay home on Election Day¹⁸⁸. Interestingly, when Rantisi actually fell victim to a successful Israeli assassination in April 2004, the administration largely defended the Israeli action¹⁸⁹.

The next example relates to the U.S.’s endorsement of the “Roadmap” plan. In spring of 2003, President Bush stated his commitment to establishing progress towards peace in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. He also pledged to establish a democratic Palestinian state. In June 2003 the U.S. acted as a third-party mediator at a meeting between Ariel Sharon and newly appointed first Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas in Aquaba in Jordan. When shortly after this event, Bush affirmed his commitment to the “Roadmap”, a Christian Zionist organization, known as the Apostolic Congress, mobilized its constituents to send over 50,000 postcards to the White House, opposing any plan that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The same organization also placed billboards in 23 cities with a quotation of Genesis, which mentioned God’s Covenant with Israel¹⁹⁰. After receiving this message from the potential electoral supporters, President Bush and his administration began to rethink the timing of its “Roadmap” endorsement. They decided not to apply any further pressure to the peace process until after the 2004 Presidential elections.

Importantly, at the beginning of 2006 Christian Zionists became vocal again. First, it was Pat Robertson who suggested in his long-running television show, “The 700 Club”, that Israeli Prime

¹⁸⁴ Rogers, op. cit.

¹⁸⁵ Some of them were also analyzed in: Napierala, Christian Zionism..., op. cit.

¹⁸⁶ Wagner, Donald: “Marching to Zion: The Evangelical-Jewish Alliance”. *Christian Century*, June 28, 2003, pp.20-24, quoted in: Haija, op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁸⁷ Haija, op. cit., p. 92.

¹⁸⁸ Zunes, op. cit.

¹⁸⁹ Haija, op. cit., p. 92. Bush administration also defended the assassination of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin in March 2004.

¹⁹⁰ More in: Rick Perlstein, “In Line for the Rapture”, *Village Voice*, retrieved 25.05.2004 from: <http://www.alternet.org/story/18780>, referred to in: Haija, op. cit., p. 92.

Minister Ariel Sharon's stroke was divine retribution for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, which Christian Zionists opposed¹⁹¹. Then in February 2006, there was a new Christian Zionist organization created in order to pressure government on Israel issues more effectively. Christians United for Israel (CUFI) was initiated by John Hagee, the influential Texas minister. Soon it became one of the most important, most active and most effective grassroots movements focused on the support of Israel. The strategy of CUFI was very precisely designed¹⁹². The organization was supposed to: encourage its members to personally speak with their elected officials, inform on every congressional representative and senator's votes concerning Israel, and organize Rapid Response Alerts in order to mobilize CUFI members at critical junctures to generate millions of phone calls and emails requesting support for Israel from the administration and Congress¹⁹³. Since its creation CUFI has been inviting important politicians to speak at such events as: the Values Voters' Summit, CUFI's Washington Summit and the Night to Honor Israel. It also awards these politicians who help the Christian Zionist cause¹⁹⁴.

CUFI proved to be effective already in July 2006, as the conflict in northern Israel and Lebanon heated up. It managed to mobilize around 3,500 conservative Evangelicals from all 50 states to come to Washington, DC and show their support for Israel. Members of CUFI urged lawmakers to let Israel do what is necessary to defend itself in its current conflict. "America needs to stand with Israel according to the word of God, and for victory," Gwen Resser said¹⁹⁵. The group also came together for a "Christians for Israel" dinner that featured Senator Rick Santorum and other powerful political officials, including Ken Mehlman, director of the Republican National Committee¹⁹⁶. And although the White House spokesman, Tony Snow, claimed that President Bush does not look at the Middle East conflict through theological perspective, to many researchers, it was clear that, the White House and Republicans in Congress take the views of evangelical Christians on the matter of Israel and a number of other matters very seriously¹⁹⁷.

These examples of Christian Zionist activity seem to prove that the RR was also able to influence the U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration more substantially than only in terms of instrumental use of their rhetoric - at least in some areas. The movement took part in the decision-making process as an important interest group representing a significant voter block for the Republican Party. Additionally, there was a new pressure group created within the RR, that turned out to be one of the most active ones in American foreign policy area. According to CUFI itself, it currently has around 4 million members, and is the largest grassroots organization in the U.S.¹⁹⁸.

In 2010, however, Lee Marsden, while stressing the effectiveness of the RR in "achieving small changes in policy"¹⁹⁹, was quite skeptical about the Christian Zionists' real influence on what he called, the "big politics". Nevertheless, I would argue that Christian Zionists had managed to influenced certain

¹⁹¹ *Roberts Suggests God smote Sharon*, CNN.com, January 6, 2006, retrieved 10.06.2007 from: <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/01/05/robertson.sharon/>.

¹⁹² More about its mission in: Mission and Vision. CUFI website. Retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.cufi.org/impact/about-us/mission-and-vision/>.

¹⁹³ Marsden, Lee: *For God's Sake*, op. cit. According to Marsden, CUFI's members receive a detailed training on how to lobby. For example they should go to meetings with senators and representatives, photograph with them, praise them for supporting certain issues, explain what CUFI's interests are (but not all at once), express hope that CUFI can count on them. They should also send letters asking support for Israel, using specific language, which would not be offensive, but rather stress personal relations. Additionally, sending flattering thank you cards is advised. CUFI also encourages its members to befriend not only senators and representatives but also their staffers and interns, invite them to Bible studies, luncheons, dinners, prayer breakfasts. Ibidem.

¹⁹⁴ Among politicians who have been awarded by CUFI, there are John Ashcroft, Dick Arney or Tom DeLay. Ibidem.

¹⁹⁵ Quoted in: Tapper, Jake / Morris Dan: "Save Israel, for Jesus?" *abc NEWS*, 2006, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <http://abcnews.go.com/nightline/story?id=2258864&page1>.

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁸ CUFI in Action, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.cufi.org/impact/about-us/cufi-in-action/>.

¹⁹⁹ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

areas of “the big policy”, even if only temporarily. For Marsden the fact that Bush had pledged the U.S. to a two-state solution in “Roadmap” and “Annapolis” meant that he had disregarded the RR’s position. However, such opinion seems to dismiss the fact that after the Christian Zionists’ protests, G.W. Bush in fact stopped advocating the “Roadmap” until the end of the election 2004 campaign, and in practice until 2007, when Annapolis negotiations started²⁰⁰. The fear of losing an important segment of the Republican Party electorate was too great. What is also important – during the Annapolis Conference Christian Zionists were active again. They protested certain solutions, for example, Prime Minister Olmert’s indication that he would be willing to give up parts of East Jerusalem. And although this time it was not only due to Christian Zionists’ efforts that the peace process ended with no success, their activity added to such result.

While the “big policy” topic might be controversial, there is no doubt however that the movement “was effective in achieving small changes in policy”, as Marsden puts it. Not only the ones connected to faith-based initiative policy within USAID or the RR’s activity within the UN, but also the ones achieved by the Christian Zionists. For Marsden, the examples of smaller scale achievements also include: Christian Zionists’ pressure on G.W. Bush to abandon his previous condemnation of Israeli incursions into Hebron and targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders in 2002 and 2003 and CUFI’s efforts to persuade the President to allow Israel more time to weaken Hezbollah and Hamas during Israel’s attacks on Southern Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008/9²⁰¹.

Concluding, what was the most important for the RR during the G.W. Bush administration was getting access to the White House and to various levels of administration, especially through the Republican Party nominations. The scale of the movement’s presence in government was unprecedented. This allowed the RR for the micro-level operations, such as winning funds for operating US foreign help programs, shifting the boundaries of church and state separation through the faith-based initiative policy, and promoting a very specific evangelical vision of human rights and religious freedom. It has to be stressed that a number of conservative Evangelicals who were granted this unprecedented access to power remained inside the Washington corridors and within the Republican Party structure, seeking to influence policy decisions and exercising their electoral power also after the change in the White House²⁰².

Barack Obama administration

In fact, although observers expected that with a change in administration the influence of the RR would diminish, it did not happen, especially at micro level. Barack Obama was not on the good terms with the RR leaders but he had no control over the nominations gained during the previous administration. Therefore, some policy areas remained under the RR’s influence. As an interest group the RR turned out to be strong enough to pressure President Obama at various occasions. The fact that the movement tried to discredit the President, e.g. by accusing him of being a Muslim or atheist, made him worried of his public image. This resulted in a search for some compromise (at least a symbolic one) with Evangelicals. So although he became the first president to refer to “non-believers” in an inaugural speech²⁰³, he did not

²⁰⁰ It is also important to note that until 2004, the official U.S. position had been that Israel, in principle, should return to the 1949 armistice lines and that changes to these lines must be mutually agreed to in final-status negotiations. Israel’s ongoing settlement activities were criticized, because they prejudiced final-status negotiations. However, in 2004 G.W. Bush took some distance from this principle. He said “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949 ... It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities”. In: *The Mideast Turmoil*, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/world/the-mideast-turmoil-for-bush-and-sharon-confidence-and-realities-are-crucial.html>

²⁰¹ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

²⁰² Ibidem.

²⁰³ *Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address*, 2009, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html>

consequently deter RR's influence on American politics. Commentators also pointed out that in order to appease the Religious Right, he invited the conservative evangelical 'megachurch' pastor Rick Warren to give the invocation at his inauguration.

In fact, it was already during the presidential campaign that Barack Obama decided to use the strategy of closing the 'God Gap' between the Democrats and the Republicans. Although he opposed many postulates and practices of the RR²⁰⁴, he did not want to lose the votes of moderate Evangelicals and promised to be friendly towards religious initiatives in general. Therefore, after the elections he decided to continue G.W. Bush's faith-based initiatives policy, even though during the campaign he criticized many elements of it (e.g. religious discrimination at hiring - that is allowing faith-based groups that receive federal funding to consider a potential employee's religion when making hiring decision)²⁰⁵. Only two weeks after taking the office, on February 5, 2009, Obama signed an executive order establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, which retained the basic administrative structure of President Bush's White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, adding only slight modifications. What Obama changed in the policy introduced by G.W. Bush was: renaming the office, appointing Joshua DuBois (a Pentecostal minister with MA Degree in International Affairs from Princeton University) as its head, and establishing a 25-member Advisory Council for the office. What was supposed to be the answer to Bush's alleged preferential treatment of evangelical initiatives, was the Advisory Council, which was to be composed of religious and secular leaders and scholars from different backgrounds. However, Obama kept the membership of the representatives of the RR in the Council and refrained himself from directly addressing the most pressing and the most controversial issues concerning the faith-based initiatives programs (including the interpretation of the First Amendment and religious discrimination at hiring)²⁰⁶.

His position and the ability to deal with the RR was even more complicated after 2010 due to two causes. First of all, a new national survey found that a substantial and growing number of Americans said that Barack Obama was a Muslim (18% - down from 11% in March 2009), while the proportion saying he was a Christian had declined (34% - down from 48% in 2009). Roughly a third of conservative Republicans (34%) said Obama was a Muslim²⁰⁷. These numbers were greatly a result of the negative campaign against Obama (co-organized by the RR) that put the President in a very uncomfortable position. The second reason that made it difficult to diminish the role of the RR was the fact that the Republicans were successful in the midterm elections, winning control of the House and gaining seats in the Senate. This meant that the interests of the RR were again well-represented.

Since then Obama's public statements concerning religion, especially his personal religion, became more frequent. In order to appease the public and the RR, he talked a lot about Christianity and the influence it had on him. He also kept mentioning his meetings with a group of his 'spiritual advisors'. The members of this group consisted of evangelical pastors whom Barack Obama gathered around him "for private prayer sessions on the telephone and for discussions on the role of religion in politics"²⁰⁸. Apart from Rev. Joel C. Hunter, the pastor of a conservative megachurch in Florida who had worked for the Christian Coalition in the past, the group included Bishop T.D. Jakes, Rev. K.H. Caldwell (who also

²⁰⁴ Obama, Barack: *Call-to-Renewal-Keynote-Address*, 2006, retrieved 13.10.2013 from: <http://obamaspeeches.com/081-Call-to-Renewal-Keynote-Address-Obama-Speech.htm>.

²⁰⁵ Pew Research Center: *Hiring Law for Groups Following a Higher Law: Faith-Based Hiring and the Obama Administration*, 2009, retrieved 02.02.2013 from: <http://www.pewforum.org/Church-State-Law/Hiring-Law-for-Groups-Following-a-Higher-Law-Faith-Based-Hiring-and-the-Obama-Administration.aspx>.

²⁰⁶ Ibidem.

²⁰⁷ Pew Research Center: *Growing Number of Americans Say Obama is a Muslim*, 2010, retrieved 02.02.2013 from: <http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-Muslim.aspx>. This topic was also analyzed in: Napierała, Paulina: "Barack Obama, Religion, and the Separation of Church and State". In: Laidler, Paweł / Turek Maciej (eds.): *2012 U.S. Presidential Election: Challenges and Expectations*. Jagiellonian University Press. Kraków 2014, pp. 223-247.

²⁰⁸ Goodstein, Laurie: "Without a Pastor of His Own, Obama Turns to Five". *New York Times*, 2009, retrieved 02.02.2013 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/us/politics/15pastor.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.

served as occasional spiritual advisers to President G.W. Bush), Rev. Otis Moss Jr., and Rev. Jim Wallis. Although none of these pastors was affiliated with the Religious Right, several were quite conservative theologically. Obama also granted a privileged access to this group to the controversial Rick Warren, considered by some scholars as the second generation of Christian Right leaders²⁰⁹.

On the other hand, while introducing more religious references in his speeches, Barack Obama attempted to take some decisions on controversial religion-related issues, which were very unpopular among religious conservatives (mostly after securing the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act on March 30, 2010). However, these decisions generally concerned domestic policy issues, such as LGBT rights (e.g. DOMA, “don’t ask don’t tell” policy) or birth control (contraceptives to be covered by Obamacare). One of the very few attempts to limit RR’s influence on faith-based programs dominated by conservative Christians was a bid to end certain contracts. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services declined to continue a grant that had been given to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to provide services to victims of human trafficking. The reason for that was that USCCB had told sub-contractors that they could not use any of the public money for abortion or contraceptive services²¹⁰. Ending such a grant might have suggested that the administration was exercising a little more oversight at least over some faith-based programs. Another, attempt to limit the power of the RR-affiliated organizations, also abroad, was rescinding the “global gag” rule in January 2009.

However, any further actions of this kind, especially those concerning foreign programs operating thanks to the faith-based policy were very difficult due to several reasons. First of all, the RR members appointed to high positions within various faith-based offices and foreign agencies remained in office. Secondly, they had strong supporters in Congress again. Marsden stresses that members of the RR at that time not only were already “disproportionately represented at the delivery end of US foreign policy”, but they also rose to the highest levels within the US armed services. Additionally they might have constituted almost two thirds of all military chaplains²¹¹. According to the researcher, military chaplains were increasingly becoming “an essential point of intelligence, contact and liaison with Muslim leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan”. He rightly points out that it is very “problematic when conservative evangelical chaplains consider their interlocutors to be spiritual enemies”²¹², however during the Obama administration the activity of the RR in such areas remained strong. It was also evident in case of USAID, which continued to promote grant applications to deliver overseas assistance from the RR-related organizations²¹³. Despite the fact that such practices created “a perception, particularly among Muslim recipients, that US foreign policy and Christianity go hand in hand”²¹⁴, the RR continued to exert influence on foreign affairs, delivering US foreign policy on the ground. Such efforts of President Obama as creating the 25-member Advisory Board on faith-based initiatives were simply not effective in restraining the RR²¹⁵. So although it was not “big politics”, the RR as an interest group was still taken into consideration at the decision-making process.

On the other hand, it seems that at least the influence of Christian Zionists on decisions concerning the Middle East policy was limited during the Obama term. Although Obama’s policy towards Israel was ambiguous, he seemed to have been immune to Christian Zionist pressures. Therefore, he was criticized

²⁰⁹ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

²¹⁰ Boston, Robert: *First Amendment, Second Term. Will President Barack Obama Stand Up For Church-State Separation? Here Are Five Critical Issues To Watch*, 2013, retrieved 02.02.2013 from: <https://www.au.org/church-state/january-2013-church-state/featured/first-amendment-second-term>.

²¹¹ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op.cit.

²¹² Ibidem.

²¹³ More in: Bettiza, op. cit.

²¹⁴ Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op.cit.

²¹⁵ Ibidem.

by CUFI many times during both his terms in the office, and called anti-semitic²¹⁶. It does not mean that his decisions were never favorable towards Israel. However, if they were, it was clear that it was the outcome of geopolitical strategy and a long-term US policy in the region. What is more, he did not use religious rhetoric in order to support his policy in the Middle East. He decided to do something radically different: in 2014, he likened the Zionist movement to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. He said that both movements seek to bring justice and equal rights to historically persecuted peoples²¹⁷.

President Obama's relationship with Israel became quite tensed due to his disappointment with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Advocating a negotiated two-state solution and peace process, Obama administration criticized the Israeli government for approving expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem. On the other hand, the President continued the US policy of vetoing UN resolutions calling for a Palestinian state (2011). He also increased aid to Israel, including funding for the Iron Dome air defense program, and while being critical on Netanyahu settlement policy, he expressed support for Israel's right to defend itself during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Eventually however, Israeli Prime Minister definitely lost Obama's trust when he criticized U.S. President's signing the Iran Nuclear Deal. Not only was the White House infuriated by Netanyahu's address to a joint session of Congress in early March 2015 but also disappointed by his statements during the reelection campaign in Israel. Netanyahu implied in his speeches that he would prevent any Palestinian state from ever coming into existence²¹⁸. Obama's reaction was serious. In the end, on December 23, 2016 the United States abstained from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334, effectively allowing it to pass²¹⁹.

Obama administration's decision met with strong criticism, both from Netanyahu and from CUFI. Christian Zionist groups organized multiple actions against it²²⁰. Additionally, on January 5, 2017, the House of Representatives voted to condemn the UN Resolution. This voting shows that although this time Christian Zionists did not influence President's decisions directly, the pressure from Congress, dominated by the Republicans (including also RR members) to reject any tension with Israel was still significant. In the end, Obama's only victory on Israel policy came with a military aid package that he managed to keep smaller than Netanyahu wanted. What is interesting, it also included a controversial measure that was supposed to limit Israeli lobbying in Washington²²¹.

The Obama term in the office proves that the role of the RR in U.S. foreign policy was not limited to the instrumental function. However, it also shows that Lee Marsden's arguments were correct: the RR's most serious achievement and claim for long lasting influence was at the micro level. The RR members

²¹⁶ Cohen, Ariel: *Christians United for Israel Chairman John Hagee Tells Jewish Audience that Obama is Anti-Semitic*, 2014, retrieved 13.03.2018 from: <http://www.jpost.com/Christian-News/Christians-United-for-Israel-Chairmans-John-Hagee-tells-Jewish-audience-that-Obama-is-Anti-Semitic-382675>.

²¹⁷ Goldberg, Jeffrey: "Obama, Netanyahu, and the Future of the Jewish State". *The Atlantic*, 2015, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/obama-netanyahu-and-the-future-of-israel/405082/>.

²¹⁸ Bresnahan, John / Doovere, Edward-Iaac: "Exclusive: Obama brushed off Reid's plea on Palestinian state". *Politico*. 2015, retrieved 10.02.2018 from: <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/reid-obama-israel-palestinians-netanyahu-united-nations-214011>.

²¹⁹ More in: AvishaiFeb, Bernard: "A Plan for Peace That Still Could Be". *New York Times*, 2011, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/magazine/13Israel-t.html>; Goldberg, op.cit.; Bresnahan, op.cit.

²²⁰ Christians United for Israel news, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.cufi.org.uk/news/pastor-john-hagee-not-president-obama-the-un-the-eu-nor-iran-hezbollah-or-hamas-can-remove-gods-blessing-from-israel/>; *Our response to the Obama Administration's Betrayal of Israel*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: http://support.cufi.org/site/MessageViewer?current=true&em_id=75968.0

²²¹ More in: *How the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resisted Obama's efforts*, 2016, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://theconversation.com/how-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-resisted-obamas-efforts-65823>; See also: Pressman, Jeremy: *Obama and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 2016, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/07/14/obama-and-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>. More on initial Obama's approach: Feldman, Shai / Shikaki Khalil: *The Obama Presidency and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, 2009, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB39.pdf>

became “skilled political operators infiltrating and controlling many local Republican parties”. They lobbied and campaigned around a narrow range of interests, encouraging senators and congressional representatives to vote in accordance with the movement’s interests. They also mastered a system of “punishments and rewards determined by voting records on those issues”²²². All these developments allowed them to become an extremely effective interest group, influencing foreign policy as well as domestic issues.

Donald Trump administration

Although it is too early to fully assess the impact of the RR on American foreign policy during the Trump administration, it is however possible to point out certain trends. Donald Trump was not the perfect presidential candidate for the RR. During the campaign James Dobson, the founder and former president of Focus on the Family, and Tony Perkins, the president of the Family Research Council preferred Senator Ted Cruz. Prominent female anti-abortion activists released an open letter, “Pro-Life Women Sound the Alarm: Donald Trump Is Unacceptable.”²²³ However, once Donald Trump seized the Republican nomination, religious conservatives realized that their only path to federal influence was to bargain with him²²⁴. “During his campaign, Trump offered conservative Evangelicals a deal: help him take the White House and he would make them more politically powerful than ever before”²²⁵. They decided to take the deal and urged the RR’s voters to overlook his character flaws, helping him win the office²²⁶. Trump on the other hand, started meeting with clergy to hear their concerns. This is how, he accepted the strategy of opposing the Johnson Amendment and being strongly against abortion²²⁷. What is interesting, Ralph Reed, the former operating director of Christian Coalition and the founder and chairman of the Faith and Freedom Coalition became the head of Donald Trump’s religious advisory board. He publically defended Trump when the accusation of sexual misconduct came to light, claiming the proof is weak and it’s not a concern for people of faith²²⁸. Evangelicals usually explained their support with the conviction that God can use the unlikeliest of men to enact his will²²⁹. In the end Trump won around 80 percent of white Evangelicals’ votes, even more than the born-again George W. Bush.

And although, as commentators often observed, Donald Trump is known rather for failing to honor his debts, in this case, he is fully repaying his Christian conservative supporters. Since he was elected, he nominated numerous RR members and sympathizers into the office. The most important nominations have included: his vice president, Mike Pence and Jeff Sessions nominated as Attorney General. Pence is known for his anti-abortion views, criticizing public schools for teaching evolution, advocating abstinence only programs and criticizing Planned Parenthood while Jeff Sessions is a conservative known for his radical views against the idea of a “wall of separation” between state and church²³⁰. The nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court is also widely considered Donald Trump’s payback to conservative

²²² Marsden, Lee: *The Christian Right...*, op. cit.

²²³ Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump, the Religious Right’s Trojan Horse”. *New York Times*, 2017, retrieved 02.11.2017 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/sunday/donald-trump-the-religious-rights-trojan-horse.html>.

²²⁴ Ibidem.

²²⁵ Montgomery, Peter: “The Religious Right Moves to Cement Political Power Under President Trump”. *The American Prospect* 2017, retrieved: 10.11.2017 from: <http://prospect.org/article/religious-right-moves-cement-political-power-under-president-trump>.

²²⁶ Ibidem.

²²⁷ Albata, Tim: „Trump and the Religious Right: A Match Made in Heaven”. *Politico* 2017, retrieved 10.11.2017 from: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/13/trump-and-the-religious-right-a-match-made-in-heaven-215251>.

²²⁸ Ibidem.

²²⁹ *Why Trump’s evangelical supporters welcome his move on Jerusalem*, 2017, retrieved 10.11.2017 from: <https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-evangelical-supporters-welcome-his-move-on-jerusalem-88775>.

²³⁰ Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump...”, op. cit.

Evangelicals²³¹. Additionally, Ben Carson, a devout Seventh-day Adventist, became the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. He believes in the approaching apocalypse in which, as he stated in 2014, “the United States will play a big role”²³² and he is skeptical about church-state separation²³³. Betsy DeVos, a billionaire and the President’s pick for Secretary of Education, is also known to be a patron of the Religious Right. She once described her work on education reform as a way to “advance God’s kingdom”²³⁴. What’s interesting Donald Trump announced that he would nominate DeVos after his initial pick, Jerry Falwell Jr., had rejected the offer²³⁵. Another very important nominee, Mike Pompeo, first confirmed as CIA director, and now as the Secretary of State, often spoke of defending Christian values and American exceptionalism. His words indicate he sees America at war with Islam. In his 2013 speech, Pompeo said Muslim leaders who fail to denounce acts of terrorism done in the name of Islam are “potentially complicit” in the attacks²³⁶. He also took part in a 2015 “God and Country” rally in Kansas where he stated that politics is “a never-ending struggle ... until the rapture.”²³⁷ Long before the nomination, he was open with his view that Christians needed to know that Jesus Christ was the only solution for the world²³⁸. More importantly, he attacked the Obama administration’s efforts to battle climate change and opposed the Paris climate agreement, being publicly skeptical about the idea that human activities are responsible for the atmosphere’s warming. He recently replaced Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of State. Unlike Pompeo, Tillerson wanted to remain part of the Paris climate accord which was not President Trump’s desire²³⁹. What is especially important in the context of this article, Pompeo is also known for his strong support for Israel²⁴⁰.

Other important nominations of the RR sympathizers also included Scott Pruitt, a longtime Environmental Protection Agency adversary, disbelieving in a climate change, who now runs this Agency, and a former Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, nominated to be a Secretary of Energy, who

²³¹ Montgomery, op.cit.

²³² Corn, David: *Ben Carson and the Satanic Sabbath Persecution Conspiracy*, 2015, retrieved 10.11.2017 from: <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/ben-carson-sabbath-persecution-satan-conspiracy/>.

²³³ What is interesting, Adventists have argued that Carson’s political positions on gun rights and religious liberty is at conflict with historic Adventist teachings in favor of nonviolence, pacifism, and the separation of church and state. More in: *Adventist Church in North America Issues Statement on Ben Carson’s U.S. Presidential Bid*, 2015, retrieved 10.11.2017 from: <https://www.adventistreview.org/church-news/story2602-adventist-church-in-north-america-issues-statement-on-ben-carsons-u.s.-presidential-bid>; Posner, Sarah: On Guns and Religious Liberty, Ben Carson “Not an Authentic Adventist, 2015, retrieved 10.11.2017 from: <http://religiondispatches.org/on-guns-and-religious-liberty-ben-carson-leaves-fellow-adventists-mystified/>.

²³⁴ Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump...”, op. cit.

²³⁵ Kalpana, Jain: *How the religious right shaped American politics: 6 essential reads*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://theconversation.com/how-the-religious-right-shaped-american-politics-6-essential-reads-89005>.

²³⁶ The speech was concerning the Boston attacks. More in: Kasperowicz, Pete: *GOP lawmaker: US Muslim leaders ‘complicit’ in terrorist attacks*, 2013, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <http://thehill.com/video/house/304743-gop-lawmaker-silence-on-terror-attacks-makes-islamic-leaders-potentially-complicit>.

²³⁷ Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump...”, op. cit. More in: Goldberg Michelle: *This Evil is All Around Us*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/01/mike_pompeo_trump_s_pick_for_the_cia_wants_a_holy_war.html

²³⁸ More in: *Mike Pompeo, a Hawk Who Pleased the President, Moves From Spying to Diplomacy*, 2018, retrieved 01.04.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/politics/pompeo-cia-trump-secretary-of-state.html>.

²³⁹ Tillerson also supported the continuation of the Iran nuclear deal, opposed by Trump. More in: Miller, Aaron D. / Sokolsky Richard: *Should Rex Tillerson Resign?*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/01/should-rex-tillerson-resign-215664>.

²⁴⁰ However, he tried to oppose Trump’s 2017 decision to move America’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. His motivation concerned safety of American employees – he feared that the resulting upheaval would endanger its officers and agents. More in: *The Trump-whisperer*, 2017, retrieved 20.03.2018 from: <https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21738905-mike-pompeo-where-foreign-policy-realism-meets-america-first-trump-whisperer>.

believes in inerrancy of the Bible and teaching intelligent design at schools²⁴¹. Due to the number of these nominations, some commentators claim that the “Christianization” of the government will occur at an administrative level, just as it did during the Bush era²⁴². To give an illustrative example: HUD regularly contracts with faith-based organizations and under Carson, more funds are likely to be channeled through conservative Christian groups, with more latitude for proselytizing in government-funded buildings²⁴³.

Apart from the nominations, the President and his vice-President, have welcomed the RR leaders in the White House for listening and strategy sessions. Among them, there are not only figures representing the well-known RR organizations (e.g. Tony Perkins), but also more colorful and controversial personalities, including: Cindy Jacobs, called a “prophet”, who claims that God is using the President to “turn the tables” on Satan, a televangelist (and convicted felon) Jim Bakker, and Donald Trump’s “spiritual adviser,” Paula White (the prosperity-gospel televangelist). Several members of President’s cabinet also gather for regular Bible study sessions with pastor Ralph Drollinger, “who teaches that the prayers of non-Christians go unheard by God, social welfare programs are un-Christian, and Christians with government jobs are obligated to hire only other Christians”²⁴⁴.

Donald Trump has also taken a number of decisions widely regarded as being a pay-back to the RR. Most of them concerned domestic politics and included such issues as: reversing a policy that included LGBT employees under US anti-discrimination law, exempting more employers (due to their religious objections) from the contraceptive insurance-coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act, or signing the Congressional Review Act to route federal money away from Planned Parenthood²⁴⁵. Additionally, he took the first step toward dismantling legal restrictions that keep churches from using charitable donations to run political campaigns by trying to revoke the Johnson Amendment²⁴⁶. Some of Donald Trump’s decisions perceived as being in accordance with the RR’s views, however, also concerned foreign policy issues.

One of President Trump’s first acts as president was to reinstate the afore mentioned “global gag rule” on abortion. Although the idea is not new, even George W. Bush himself specifically exempted from the rule his H.I.V./AIDS program. President Trump on the other hand, signed an executive order applying the rule to all recipients of American global health aid. Therefore not only did he reinstate the policy but also widely expanded it, making it cover all global health organizations that receive U.S. government funding, rather than only family planning organizations. This concerns offices such as, USAID, the Department of State, Global Aids Coordinator, Center of Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute of Health, and Department of Defense²⁴⁷.

Another step which echoed RR’s sentiments and which had serious consequences to international relations was the introduction of the President’s Executive Order 13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”, and often referred to as the “Muslim ban” or the “travel ban”²⁴⁸. It was widely criticized and blocked by various courts. Daniel Mach, director of the

²⁴¹ More in: Montgomery, op. cit. What is interesting, Tom Price, Mr. Trump’s choice for Secretary of Health and Human Services, who had to resign in September 2017 due to private jet scandal, was also strongly supported by the National Right to Life Committee.

²⁴² Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump...”, op. cit.

²⁴³ Ibidem.

²⁴⁴ Montgomery, op. cit. Drollinger is also on record as being anti-LGBTQ, anti-women’s rights, and declaring Catholicism as “one of the primary false religions of the world”. More in: Gander, Kashmira: *White House Bible Study led by Pastor who is Anti-gay, Anti-women and Anti-Catholic*, 2018, retrieved 15.04.2018 from: <http://www.newsweek.com/white-house-bible-group-led-pastor-anti-gay-anti-women-anti-catholic-881860>.

²⁴⁵ Alberta, op. cit.

²⁴⁶ In the end the effort to get rid of Johnson Amendment did not succeed although it was supported by conservative activists such as Ralph Reed and Jerry Falwell Jr., and had strong backing from the Alliance Defending Freedom. More in: Gjeltén, Tom: *Another Effort To Get Rid Of The ‘Johnson Amendment’ Fails*, 2018, retrieved 02.04.2018 from: <https://www.npr.org/2018/03/22/596158332/another-effort-to-get-rid-of-the-johnson-amendment-fails>.

²⁴⁷ More in: Goldberg, Michelle: “Donald Trump...”, op. cit.

²⁴⁸ It was in effect from 27 January 2017, until 16 March 2017, when it was superseded by Executive Order 13780.

ACLU Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief stated that: “Through his Muslim [travel] ban, the president has shown outright hostility toward an entire faith. At the same time, his administration has embraced the deeply troubling idea that religious freedom is a blank check to discriminate and to harm others”²⁴⁹. Many religious organizations (not related to the RR) warned that President Trump’s initiatives would impinge on religious liberty. The Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty has criticized the travel ban for disfavoring Muslims²⁵⁰. Many commentators argued that this document rather served spreading a specific anti-Muslim rhetoric than the country’s safety. Additionally, the list of countries whose citizens were included in the “ban” was very controversial. What is crucial, however, is the fact that Donald Trump seemed to have adopted a simplified vision equating the “war on terror” with the “war on Islam” long promoted by the RR. Not surprisingly, the RR praised the President for introducing the ban.

The same kind of rhetoric dominated in the discussion on promoting religious freedom around the world. The White House made a strong verbal commitment to addressing violence against religious minorities overseas, while vice-President Pence focused on the role of the military in addressing global religious-freedom issues. He promised religious leaders, including Franklin Graham that protecting the freedom of faith will be a foreign-policy priority of the Trump administration. What is more, he immediately linked it to the fight against Islam, emphasizing the need to defeat “radical Islamic terrorists,” and specifically ISIS. He also stressed that the administration was “reaffirming America’s role as a beacon of hope and life and liberty,” and declared that “America was and is and ever will be a shining city on a hill”²⁵¹. These declarations were made mainly because a major point of concern among conservatives during the Obama administration was the White House’s alleged lack of attention to violence against religious groups in the Middle East.

The President himself also often referred to religion while discussing foreign policy and America’s role in the world. His speeches included such statements as: terrorism is “a battle between good and evil,” Islam “hates us”. What is more, his administration started to present religion (specifically Islam) as “a more significant contributing factor to violent extremism than, say, structural causes such as politics, economics, corruption, or localized conflict, which tended to be the emphasis of the Obama administration”²⁵². The religious and islamophobic language used by the President and members of his administration in order to describe international relations or U.S. foreign policy was largely borrowed from the RR. Carson for example went as far as claiming that Islam is not a religion but a “life organization system”²⁵³. According to specialists from Columbia Law School, comments that refer to Islam as a political ideology or simply not a religion are supposed to suggest that Islam should not receive First Amendment protections²⁵⁴.

Additionally, Trump administration decided to minimize the role of the Office of Religion and Global Affairs (RGA) which was established in 2013 by professor Shaun Casey (as part of the State Department)²⁵⁵. The RGA’s mission was: advising the Secretary of State on religious matters, engaging religious actors, assessing religious dynamics globally, resisting stereotypes and “interpret religious

²⁴⁹ Biskupic, Joan: *Trump Puts Faith in Religious Right*, 2017, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/14/politics/donald-trump-religious-conservatives-appeals/index.html>

²⁵⁰ They also opposed lifting the Johnson Amendment. More in: *ibidem*.

²⁵¹ As quoted in: Green, Emma: *Protecting Religious Freedom Is a Foreign-Policy Priority of the Trump Administration*, 2017, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/religious-freedom-trump-administration/526320/>.

²⁵² Green, Emma: *How Religion Made a Global Comeback in 2017*, 2017, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/religion-trump/548780/>.

²⁵³ He also compared Syrian refugees to “a rabid dog running around your neighborhood.” Quoted in: *Church, State and the Trump Administration*, 2017, retrieved 10.01.2018 from:

http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/PRPCP/prpcp_trump_church_state.pdf

²⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵⁵ at the request of the former Secretary of State John Kerry.

dynamics in a manner that reflected nuance and study”²⁵⁶. However, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson early on announced that he would fold the RGA into the Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF). This meant that the titles of special representative for religion and global affairs, the special representative to Muslim communities, and the special envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation would be eliminated, and the special envoy to monitor and combat anti-Semitism would be moved to another bureau. As Shaun Casey wrote, “It is clear that the senior leadership at the White House and the State Department does not want to engage a broad set of religious communities, preferring instead to focus mainly on evangelical and fundamentalist Christians”. He stressed that “the anti-Muslim rhetoric from the campaign has now crystalized into a rejection of the Obama administration’s strategy of engaging the Muslim world on a broad global scale”²⁵⁷. Casey warned that in addition to the short-term goal of instrumentalization of religion, there is also a greater threat resulting from such attitude in the long run. Mainly: a policy of “dismantling the strategy of integrating religious understanding into U.S. diplomacy” while rewarding only conservative Christians, may result in the next administration’s position to “see religion as an analytical category so poisoned and compromised as to be irredeemable”²⁵⁸.

Despite such warnings, one of the most spectacular and suggestive foreign policy issues undertaken by President Trump was the Jerusalem case. His announcement that the U.S. would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel arrived already on December 6th, 2017, and received widespread criticism. “Observers quickly recognized the decision as related not so much to national security concerns as to domestic U.S. politics and promises candidate Trump made to his evangelical supporters, who welcomed the announcement”²⁵⁹. Many commentators were worried the decision meant that: “Apocalyptic Christianity Returns to U.S. Foreign Policy”²⁶⁰. Leaders of CUFI, on the other hand, welcomed not only Donald Trump’s formal recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel but especially his announcement that the US would move its embassy from Tel Aviv to the Holy City. They also stressed that his decision was largely the effect of their intensive campaign. As they wrote:

“CUFI has made moving the embassy to Jerusalem a central focus of its 2017 agenda. The group’s founder and Chairman, Pastor John Hagee, has used White House audiences with Pres. Trump and Vice Pres. Mike Pence to urge them to move the embassy. Days before Pres. Trump’s inauguration, the CUFI Action Fund held a Washington fly-in during which more than 260 leaders representing 49 states urged that the embassy be moved. And CUFI members have sent more than 137,000 emails to the White House in support of moving the embassy to Jerusalem”²⁶¹.

The leading Christian Zionist, John Hagee, expressed his gratitude for the decision, stressing that President changed American policy to finally reflect this reality²⁶². It is important however to point out that, apart from the decision concerning Jerusalem, CUFI reported other victories in 2017 and announced them on its website:

“Over 1,000,000 emails to Congress in support of the Taylor Force Act. In December, the House of Representatives passed the Taylor Force Act and sent it to the Senate. (...). Over 43,000

²⁵⁶ Casey, Shaun: *How the State Department Has Sidelined Religion’s Role in Diplomacy*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <http://religionandpolitics.org/2017/09/05/how-the-state-department-has-sidelined-religions-role-in-diplomacy/>.

²⁵⁷ Ibidem.

²⁵⁸ Ibidem.

²⁵⁹ Ingersol, Julie: *Why Trump’s Evangelical Supporters Welcome His Move on Jerusalem*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-evangelical-supporters-welcome-his-move-on-jerusalem-88775>.

²⁶⁰ Feffer, John: *Apocalyptic Christianity Returns to U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2018, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <http://www.ips-dc.org/apocalyptic-christianity-returns-u-s-foreign-policy/>.

²⁶¹ *CUFI Welcomes Pres. Trump’s Jerusalem Policy*, 2018, retrieved 10.04.2018 from: <https://www.cufi.org/cufi-welcomes-pres-trumps-jerusalem-policy/>.

²⁶² Ibidem.

emails to Congress in support of Hezbollah sanctions. In October, less than a month after CUFI began flooding Capitol Hill inboxes, the House and Senate passed legislation designed to cripple Hezbollah's international financing. Nearly 30,000 emails to the Senate in support of David Friedman's nomination. CUFI members helped secure the confirmation of Friedman as US Ambassador to Israel²⁶³

CUFI members stress that they started to take action as early as January 2017 "after the Obama Administration betrayed Israel by allowing UNSC Resolution 2334 to pass". According to the information on their website, "Over 250 of CUFI's top grassroots leaders from 49 states flew to Washington DC at a moment's notice for an emergency Summit and held urgent meetings with their Senators". The website also informs that already in April 2017 "CUFI's top leadership was invited to the White House and met privately with Vice President Mike Pence and President Donald Trump to discuss the importance of America's support for Israel"²⁶⁴. John Hagee, who attended White House meetings, said that "Moving to Jerusalem would prove that our president stands by his word"²⁶⁵. This suggests that certain promises were made to the Christian Zionist movement as soon as there was a change in the White House. It also shows that the pressure on the new President (who is heavily indebted to the RR) has been very strong. Naturally, Trump's move on Jerusalem was understood among Christian Zionists as being linked to a biblical prophecy²⁶⁶. They even compared Trump to King Cyrus of the Bible, the King who allowed Jew to return to Jerusalem after exile in the Babylonian Empire²⁶⁷.

What is interesting however is that Donald Trump never used the term "undivided" when talking about Jerusalem as the capital of Israel²⁶⁸. Additionally, while Christian Zionists celebrated White House support for their cause, his administration was busy making a deal with an Islamic state. According to The New York Times, around the time of CUFI-Trump negotiations on Jerusalem, Jared Kushner, the Senior Advisor to the President, was involved in negotiating the sale of arms (worth over a billion dollars) to Saudi Arabia²⁶⁹. This country was also the first foreign destination of the President, not only because it remains the pivotal U.S. ally against Iran but also due to lucrative deals it might offer. For the American national interest this is much more important than its religion (contrary to what Christian Zionists would like to think). Moreover, the Trump administration is open to new deals with other Islamic countries, including Egypt or Turkey.

On the other hand, the rhetoric borrowed from Christian Zionists helps Donald Trump present Iran as the biggest enemy in the region. One of the reasons why the administration wants to keep U.S. troops in Syria is to block Iran from expanding its influence in the country. According to analysts, there are some indications that the Trump administration is gearing up for a direct confrontation with Iran. In this case,

²⁶³ *We grew our IMPACT*, retrieved 10.03.2018 from:

http://support.cufi.org/2017/CUFIin2017.html?_ga=2.59172141.1284017311.1525208423-177597460.1525208423.

²⁶⁴ Ibidem.

²⁶⁵ Kampeas, Ron: *Christian Zionists Still Uncertain About Trump - But They're Glad He's Not Obama*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://forward.com/news/breaking-news/377352/christian-zionists-cufi-trump-pence-obama-israel/>.

²⁶⁶ Kalpana, op. cit.

²⁶⁷ CBN news, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjXN_AL3NZA.

²⁶⁸ Some commentators suggest that by avoiding the term "undivided capital of Israel", he left the door open for Israelis and Palestinians to divide the city during any final status negotiations between the two sides. More in: Williams, Jennifer / Wildman Sarah: *Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, explained*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/12/6/16741528/trump-jerusalem-speech-israel-tel-aviv>.

²⁶⁹ *\$110 Billion Weapons Sale to Saudis Has Jared Kushner's Personal Touch*, 2017, retrieved 10.01.2018 from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/middleeast/jared-kushner-saudi-arabia-arms-deal-lockheed.html>. In fact, Donald Trump and his advisers are eager to take credit for such a massive arms deal, however some of these weapons sales had already been approved under Obama. More in: Bazzi, Mohamad: *Saudi Arabia Has High Hopes for Trump*, 2017, retrieved 10.03.2018 from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/saudi-arabia-trump-iran-riyadh-salman/527463/>.

the religious demagoguery of Gog and Magog could be used instrumentally, just like it was used during the times of the Cold War (when the Soviet Union was the enemy) or during G.W. Bush's administration when Saddam Hussain was depicted as Gog²⁷⁰. However, the U.S. need both allies to fight Iran: Israel and Saudi Arabia. The alliance with Saudi Arabia gives President important resources to fight Iran. Therefore, it is very likely that the use of Christian Zionist rhetoric, as well as moving the embassy to Jerusalem might only be symbolic gestures which prove that the current administration uses religious arguments instrumentally – in order to achieve bigger geopolitical goals.

However, even if Donald Trump's initial intention was to use the RR rhetoric only instrumentally, the actual decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem caused serious consequences, influencing the already tensed situation in the Middle East. If he considered it only a simple symbolic gesture to appease the RR and Christian Zionists, or to pay them back, maybe even to manifest his (unilateral) power, it did not remain only on the symbolic level. And despite the fact that: "White House officials repeatedly stressed that Trump's announcement doesn't represent a change in US policy on the future borders of Jerusalem"²⁷¹, it was understood otherwise by the Palestinians and their allies. In consequence it led to riots, destabilization, and blood-shed.

Summing up, Donald Trump, just like his predecessors, (at least so far) has allowed the RR to influence foreign politics either symbolically, or basically on the micro-level: through nominations and faith-based policy at the international and foreign aid level. In terms of the "big policy" issues the influence of the RR might again seem mostly rhetorical. Most likely, the President himself is convinced that the symbolic use of religious rhetoric is quite helpful and harmless (both in domestic politics as well as in foreign policy). Therefore, he treats his relationship with the RR transactional (as most of his relations)²⁷². Nevertheless, words have consequences. It might seem that it does not cost much to use certain expressions or religious justifications, and that the language itself can easily be used to pay back electoral debts. In reality, however, certain statements can make serious impact – on world peace, religious dialog and, as much as it sounds ironically - on furthering the instrumental use of religion. On the surface, the use of "us-vs.-them" rhetoric simply allows the President to portrait himself as a strong politician: the savior and protector of the nation, without preventing him from doing business with Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia. In reality, however, it might lead to complicating or intensifying international conflicts, just like in the case of Palestine and Israel. It also might hinder the peace process and prevent any progress of the religious dialog with Muslim countries (including U.S. allies). Therefore, apart from agreeing with Lee Marsden that the real achievement of the RR and claim for its long lasting influence comes at the micro level – especially through RR members' nominations, "infiltration" of the Republican Party, and delivery of U.S. foreign aid – it is necessary to stress that the symbolic use of the RR's rhetoric on the "big policy" issues may also bring significant consequences at a macro level during the Trump administration.

Conclusions

It seems that the main hypothesis of the essay has been confirmed. It is possible for the RR movement to influence some of the U.S. foreign policy decisions and through them also (at least to a certain degree) the international relations in general. It can happen when religious arguments are applied in "big politics" – just as happened in the case of Jerusalem. Most often however it happens slowly and gradually, beginning with a micro-level, especially through faith-based policy concerning the delivery of U.S. foreign aid or through anti-UN campaigns. Also the rise of the RR representatives to highest position in the Republican Party cannot be ignored.

²⁷⁰ "Bush referred to the Biblical prophecies regarding Gog and Magog that suggested to some evangelicals that the end times were approaching in the Middle East". Feffer, op. cit.

²⁷¹ Williams/Wildman, op. cit.

²⁷² More in: Goldberg, Michelle: "Donald Trump...", op. cit.

The analysis conducted above also shows that the RR is a well-structured, well-organized and an active interest group operating not only on the domestic ground but also in the foreign policy area. As a foreign policy pressure group it relies on a very specific religious ideology that shapes its foreign policy goals and determines specific areas of international interests. The aims of the group are well-defined, and international actors and forces considered hostile are precisely identified (although the latter may change in the course of history). The RR uses specific and quite sophisticated methods in order to achieve its foreign policy aims, including lobbying and other forms of political (especially electoral) pressure. Most of the organizations that constitute the RR have divisions dedicated to international interests, and some are specifically committed to lobbying for the movement's foreign policy agenda. Such a well-structured and well-equipped interest group as the RR can definitely play a role in the foreign policy decision-making process just like other pressure groups whose interests are taken into consideration by political leaders.

Therefore, I argue that in the case of the RR, it is possible to assess the influence of its religious beliefs on U.S. foreign policy by using one of FPA models (e.g.: political process model, governmental bargaining model or, as postulated by Pugacewicz, neopluralist theory of the decision making²⁷³). Additionally, keeping in mind that through certain foreign policy decisions religious views might influence international relations in general, it is also worth applying one of those IR theories that are ready to accommodate religion into their frameworks. If we assume that belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence, may impact the proclivities of some political leaders, the classical realist framework can be helpful (as Sandal and James postulate)²⁷⁴. However, since the RR is such a well-organized interest group, it would be most useful to connect FPA with IR theories – just like a new generation of Neoclassical Realists attempts to do or as Bettiza proposes in his work²⁷⁵. All of these approaches allow for including the activity of the RR into both, U.S. foreign policy and IR analysis.

The essay demonstrates that throughout its existence on American political scene, the RR movement has tried to influence a number of U.S. foreign policy decisions. Sometimes its interests were overlapping or corresponding with the interests of other interests groups (AIPAC's, neoconservatives' and others) and sometimes they were not. When they resonated with national interests of the U.S., it was only the language or rhetoric of the movement that was used by the state officials to legitimize state actions. It does not mean however that religious views promoted by the RR were always used only instrumentally, as a tool of legitimacy. Neither should they be viewed in the way primordialists (as defined by Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger) would like to see the influence of religion, namely as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent interactions in and between nations. Although there were administrations that were eager to use Samuel Huntington's rhetoric to explain international conflicts in the world (including the recent administration of Donald Trump), there is a great deal of evidence that it is not religion that determines U.S. relations with other countries. One of the arguments against the primordialist view is that the U.S. has supported numerous Muslim countries or provided them with arms supplies regardless of Christian Zionists' protests (as in the case of the arms sales to Saudi Arabia). Therefore, since religious views of the RR, just like other competing interests, sometimes did manage to influence U.S. foreign policy decisions and through them international relations (at least in certain areas), it is possible to talk about what Hasenclever and Rittberger call a moderately constructive role of religion in IR. What is more, this role is constructive not only in preventing conflicts (as Hasenclever and Rittberger would like to see it) but also in intensifying conflicts or complicating international disputes (as many examples of Christian Zionist activity have shown).

²⁷³ Pugacewicz, op. cit., pp. 235-249.

²⁷⁴ It's also important to note that some activities of Christian Zionist organizations can be analyzed within the liberal school of thought (adjusted to accommodate religious factors as Sandler and James suggest). It is possible because some of the Christian Zionist organizations are focused on influencing certain aspects of international relations directly – without the mediation of the state. This however is not the point of this analysis.

²⁷⁵ Bettiza, op.cit.

Summing up, the RR has been successful in advocating its controversial religious ideas in American foreign policy because as an interest group it skillfully exerted pressure on America's powerful elite. Therefore, the RR is also able to impact (rather negatively) such IR areas as: environmental issues, human rights (including sexual and religious minorities' rights), or Middle East conflicts (especially Israeli-Palestinian relations). Its actions in the international area, according to Marsden, may result in fueling hostility against the U.S. In the Middle East this hostility might lead to escalating terrorism and radicalization or even to creating new terrorist organizations. The inception of new transnational networks (including terrorist ones) may in turn bring a modification in the structure of the IR. Therefore, the consequences of the RR's presence on international scene can be significant.

To close I would like to go back to Shireen Hunter's opinions and contrast them with Lee Marsden views. Hunter, who thinks that religion has been used as any other ideology in IR, mainly to legitimize state actions, claims that: "This situation, notwithstanding the new found fascination with the impact of religion on international affairs, has not changed. Religion is neither the source of conflicts and disputes nor a panacea for global problems."²⁷⁶ Lee Marsden admits that the role of religion in IR should not be over-emphasized, as primordialists would like to do, because it "is but one of many competing interests demanding the attention of political elites in determining foreign policy choices". However, he stresses that religion "is a significant voice"²⁷⁷ in international relations. Agreeing with Lee Marsden, I argue that religion, especially in a form promoted by the RR, should be taken seriously, and included in the U.S. foreign policy analysis models.

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²⁷⁶ Hunter, op. cit.

²⁷⁷ Marsden, Lee: *The Christina Right*, op. cit.

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